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1 November 1984

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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OPEC'S POLICIES, OPTIONS VIEWED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 73, 1 Sep 84 pp 57-58

[Article by Salih Zaytun: "OPEC Facing Two Choices, the Better of Them Is Bitter: Reduced Production or Falling Prices"]

[Text] In statements to AL-TADAMUN Dr Mani' al-'Utaybah says, "We may have to reduce production by 1 million barrels."

Belkacem Nabi says, "Some members of OPEC have exceeded their quotas."

Venezuela's minister of oil says, "Conditions in the oil market could improve soon."

The Oil Follow-Up Committee which was created by OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, is expected to hold a meeting during the first half of this September.

Oil sources indicated to AL-TADAMUN that a final evaluation of the tours that were made by OPEC delegations in oil producing countries that are members of OPEC, as well as those that are not, will be made at that meeting. Those countries that are not members of OPEC have a considerable effect on the status of the oil market.

These sources indicated that the meeting of the Follow-Up Committee, which is expected to be held at OPEC headquarters in Vienna, may set a date for an emergency meeting of the ministerial council of OPEC countries in mid September. It is not unlikely that that meeting will also be held in Vienna.

Oil ministers will consider the latest developments in the oil market in the light of supply and demand during the 2 months that followed OPEC's regular meeting, which was held in Vienna early last July.

At their emergency conference OPEC ministers will have to make extraordinary decisions that have to do with prices and production. These decisions will be made in the light of the recent results of the OPEC ministers' tour and the status of the oil market.

Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, the United Arab Emirates' minister of oil and

chairman of the Follow-Up Committee, affirmed in an interview with AL-TADAMUN that the predominant tendency for OPEC now is to reduce production levels by 1 million barrels a day to confront the current surplus in the market which, if allowed to continue, will have a negative effect on the price structure.

During a stopover in Qatar while he was heading an OPEC delegation visiting oil producing countries, al-'Utaybah explained that OPEC would fight to keep its current price structure. It will, therefore, have to reduce production levels to 16.5 million barrels a day instead of 17.5 million barrels.

Al-'Utaybah added that OPEC will not allow a reduction in the current price of oil, which is 29 dollars a barrel, even though some oil producing countries are trying to sell their oil for less and oil companies are trying to flood the market with a contrived surplus so as to influence the price structure.

Al-'Utaybah expected a noticeable improvement in the oil market in the last quarter of this year, that is after the emergency conference is convened. That conference will assume the responsibility of making the decision to reduce production levels.

Al-'Utaybah attacked the oil consuming countries and chiefly those that come under the umbrella of the International Energy Agency. He said that these countries were applying awesome pressures to undermine OPEC's role and prestige and to limit the gains that had been made by OPEC countries throughout the life of the organization.

The United Arab Emirates' minister of oil did not wish to define the means by which OPEC will confront the challenges from industrial countries. He did, however, affirm that OPEC was capable of taking action to defend its rights.

Al-'Utaybah did not rule out a discussion about amending the quotas of the oil producing countries within OPEC in the light of reduced production so as not to create any hardship for any of the 13 countries.

Al-'Utaybah advised oil consuming countries and industrial countries as well to realize the gravity of the challenges and the pressures they were trying to impose on OPEC. He said these countries had to remember that in the final analysis we were all in the same boat and that if anyone tried to drill a hole in that boat we would all drown.

Concerning the results of his recent tour in OPEC countries al-'Utaybah said that he and the delegation that was accompanying him sensed an encouraging responsiveness in Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya and Iraq to adhere to OPEC's two-part policy on prices and production. He added that the countries he had visited affirmed their steadfastness in the face of outside pressures. He indicated that these countries would not be alone in the battle that will be fought in the oil market because the outcome of this battle will threaten the economies of the industrial nations before threatening any other nation.

Algeria's minister of oil, Belkacem Nabi, who accompanied al-'Utaybah on his visit to Qatar, emphasized the need to reduce maximum production. He said that reducing production was required by the current factors of the market where there is a noticeable surplus.

When the Algerian minister was asked about who was responsible for that surplus, he said candidly, "Some OPEC countries exceeded the quotas that were set for them in the London Agreement. Besides, there is a noticeable increase in oil production by Britain and Norway from the oil in the North Sea."

When Venezuela's minister of oil, Hernandez Grissanti, member of the OPEC delegation who met the prince of Qatar was asked for his assessment of the oil market, he said that he sensed there were positive indicators and that the status of the oil market would improve. He indicated that in the coming weeks production levels and current prices would stabilize.

It is worth noting that the delegation which included two Arab ministers whose countries have boycotted Egypt since the Camp David Accords [were signed], stopped in Cairo for hours on their way to Istanbul where the delegation presented a report to al-Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan who was then on an official visit to Turkey.

OPEC sources have expressed their satisfaction with Egypt's position. Egypt has maintained its production at a volume that did not exceed 300,000 barrels a day. It has also maintained the price of 28 dollars a barrel. This is a record price considering the modest quality of Egypt's oil.

It is known that Egypt exports its oil to 17 foreign countries. In addition, it sells oil products to foreign ships and airplanes. In return, it earns 3 billion dollars a year, and that includes fees for transporting Gulf oil through the SUMID pipeline.

OPEC has complained about the fact that the Soviet Union, which competes with OPEC in the world market, reduced its oil prices by 1.50 dollars a barrel. This has added new pressures on OPEC's sales as OPEC defends its current price for oil, which is 29 dollars, compared with 27.50 dollars for a barrel of Soviet oil.

In anticipation of any oil price war in the future that may result from the nervous and unsettled conditions of the oil market, OPEC sources do not rule out that al-Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabia's minister of oil and mineral resources, could include Moscow as one of the stops on the trip he has been asked to make by OPEC. Yamani is supposed to hold talks on market conditions with Britain, Norway and Mexico so that a gentleman's agreement can be reached between all the oil producing countries.

If Yamani does visit the Soviet Union, that visit will be tantamount to a positive indication for the future of Saudi-Soviet relations where unpublicized contacts have been taking place in view of the Soviets' significant political role in the area.

Oil observers believe that the step Saudi Arabia is taking toward the Soviet Union will have its impact on both oil and politics. As much as it will be politically useful in strengthening Soviet efforts to solve the Middle East crisis, it will also be useful to OPEC countries as far as oil is concerned, since it would rule out Soviet oil becoming a serious competitor for OPEC oil.

In keeping with this notion al-Shaykh Yamani held Britain responsible for maintaining a sound situation in the oil market so as to ensure that current prices

remain unchanged. He warned that reducing prices will not serve anyone's interests: not the interests of OPEC countries and not the interests of the oil consuming countries. There was an implied threat in his words when he said that some western banks could become bankrupt if oil prices were to fall by four dollars a barrel. Moreover, a reduction in the price of oil would threaten exploratory activities and would shut down costly oil fields. Yamani warned Britain in particular when he said that a reduction in Britain's oil prices would make its oil cheaper than coal, and that would threaten Britain's coal industry whose returns equal Britain's returns from oil.

A change in Britain's oil prices will encourage Norway, Britain's partner in North Sea oil, to reduce its prices also. Therefore, Yamani's mission in these two countries will be a vital one. He has to stabilize current conditions in the oil market as far as prices are concerned in return for a promise that there will be a relative reduction in the volume of production.

At any rate, one of OPEC's missions in the next stage will be not only to persuade oil producing countries that are not members of OPEC not to exceed the current price and production policy, but it will also have to encourage them to join OPEC so that this policy can be consolidated and the organization can be given a larger role worldwide.

Mexico is the oil producing country that is most likely to join OPEC. This country has won OPEC's appreciation because of its positive position on controlling production for the purpose of strengthening the price structure that OPEC uses in the oil market.

OPEC views Mexico as a candidate for membership in the organization since it invited it last February to attend the 12th training course for journalists that OPEC held. This course provided an opportunity for OPEC officials and Mexican officials to hold talks. OPEC's current president, Kamil Hasan al-Maqhur, who is Libya's minister of oil, was the one who was in charge of that course, and he was also the one who took part in talks with the Mexican government. Mr al-Maqhur received definite assurances that Mexico would not exceed its current oil quota of 1.5 million barrels a day.

It is worth noting that Mexico's minister of oil did attend the recent Vienna conference that was held last July. He attended as an observer. This was considered an attempt by Mexico to get closer to OPEC and to take a closer look at the organization in preparation for an announcement that it was joining OPEC.

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RELATIONS BETWEEN ARAB STATES, TURKEY DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1452, 31 Aug 84 pp 30,32

[Article: "Turkey's Return to the Arab Scene Consolidated by Joint Military Cooperation"]

[Text] A new chapter in Arab-Turkish relations, specifically in the area of military cooperation, has been started. Because such relations had been almost frozen for many decades, there is a set of details regarding the future course of these relations that demand our attention. Nevertheless, the reinforcement of Arab-Turkish cooperation remains a significant indication that will have a considerable effect on conditions in the area for a long time in the future.

Turkey's minister of defense, Zeki Yavuzturk, visited both Saudi Arabia and Egypt in less than 4 weeks. After the first visit ended, Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, Saudi Arabia's second deputy prime minister and minister of defense and aviation announced that both sides had attained a formula for coordinating [their efforts] in the area of weapons production. Saudi sources added that a later date had been set for a Saudi delegation to visit Turkey to review the establishment of new military factories.

In Cairo President Husni Mubarak received the Turkish minister who later held lengthy talks with Field Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, Egypt's vice president and minister of defense and military production. At the end of these talks both sides signed a protocol for cooperation between Egypt and Turkey in the area of military industries.

On the other hand Taha Yasin Ramadan, Iraq's first deputy prime minister, has just concluded a visit to Ankara where he signed an agreement with Turkey's prime minister, Turgut Ozal to build a second pipeline between Iraq and Turkey. At the same time an Israeli delegation was successfully concluding a series of talks in Washington to foil the Iraqi-Jordanian pipeline project.

While this sequence of events was occurring, al-Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Aal Nuhayan, president of the United Arab Emirates, was concluding his talks in Ankara with Turkey's president Kenan Evrin. These are the talks that dealt with the Gulf war and the Middle East crisis as well as Turkey's expected role in the developments of these two problems.

What is the explanation for this Turkish summer? What does a manifest effective role for Turkey in the area mean? What are the possible limitations of such a role?

A popular Turkish proverb which states that similar kinds of soil produce similar flowers may provide an appropriate interpretation for some of the recent Turkish-Arab events. Three months ago Turgut Ozal the prime minister of Turkey told AL-HAWADITH, "We are laying ambitious plans to produce advanced and modern weapons in the country. We are particularly looking forward to the participation of our friends in the area in this major project." It did not take too long for this aspiration to become an actual fact confirming that similar kinds of soil do in fact produce similar flowers.

The similarity in the soil is a fact that has existed for a long time. The Islamic bond that brings the two countries together places them in the same bunker even though a few Turkish governments had denied that. Despite that the import of the popular Turkish proverb was not fulfilled until after those new simultaneous developments which have been occurring in Turkey and the Gulf since the fall of 1980.

During that fall there was a military coup in Ankara that soon introduced profound changes in Turkey's political directions. Then war broke out in the Gulf between Iraq and Iran. This was followed by a change in the U.S. administration that, unlike any such change that had taken place before, affected relations between the United States and its NATO allies. This sequence of developments was rapidly creating ties of a new kind between the Arab countries and Turkey.

In Ankara the particulars of the general political crisis that preceded the coup had prevented Turkey from formulating any effective political posture toward the Middle East. This is because Turkish policy was not Turkish, but it was rather the sum total of the influences exerted by a group of foreign powers, each of which was having its input and its impact on decisions that were made in Ankara.

The fact that Turkey occupies the farthest NATO position in the East has placed it unwittingly in a very difficult position. On the one hand, Turkey found itself forced into the balance of powers game between the Soviets and the Americans. On the other hand, Turkey became the bargaining ground between Western Europe and Washington when the Europeans were striving to create what was then called "a third power" that would try to reduce international tensions and develop economic relations with eastern bloc countries.

The effect of this balancing of powers between the two superpowers becomes evident when we go back to 1977. That was when Washington imposed a military embargo on Ankara despite the fact that the latter is a member of NATO, [an organization] whose backbone is the United States.

It was natural that such action would create a profound feeling among Turks that Washington had not been true to its pledges. This feeling was reinforced by the fact that Washington's decision affected Turkey's traditional interest in developing the country's military capability. It seems evident that even now these feelings are still lurking in the hearts of Turks.

After U.S. military shipments to Turkey were banned, Ankara turned down all

invitations from Washington to take part in the rapid deployment forces in the Gulf at a time when these forces were an American political "shockwave" which was preoccupying the international political stage.

But the military coup created considerable confusion which soon became total confusion when the U.S. administration was changed. On the one hand, it became evident that the "centralization" of political decisions in Ankara and the elimination of the chaos that was prevalent in the country could evolve an independent Turkish interest and hence an independent Turkish policy. On the other hand, the American political tendency that had just reached the White House was known for rejecting an independent Europe within the western alliance. It was also known for its continued rejection of detente and of developing economic relations with eastern bloc countries along the same lines that were in effect under the previous administration.

It seemed that Turkey had distanced itself from Europe at a time when Europe had an urgent need to play its ace with the new powers in Washington. It also seemed that the attempt to contact the new military crew in Ankara had not produced results that were satisfactory to the Europeans. Thus, Europe unleashed the fires of its media against the military regime in Ankara to protest human rights violations in Turkey. The intensity of that campaign was such as to suggest the identity of those who were behind it. European capitals granted political asylum to hundreds who opposed the Turkish regime and who, with the knowledge of European authorities, did not stop their activities against the military government. At that time this meant that Europe was trying to use everything it had to apply pressure on Ankara to keep it in line with the European community when the time comes for adopting a collective western policy in NATO.

Ankara, however, was preoccupied with its own domestic affairs. The new military government was faced with waves of political violence and deteriorating economic conditions. It was no easy matter to solve these two questions so that attention could be devoted to the issues of Turkish-European relationships.

What happened after that may turn out to be a lesson in political irony when politics suddenly becomes cynical. Europe gave in to the plan of the new U.S. administration and approved the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles on European territory. Meanwhile, Turkey continued to be preoccupied with its own efforts to put its domestic house in order. In other words Europe did exactly what it had warned Turkey not to do while at the same time Turkey, in its striving toward an independent existence, did what Europe has been unable to do.

Europe's campaign against Turkey raised a question about the feasibility of an alliance with Europe. In other words, in 3 years only, from 1977 to 1980, the Turks had learned that ties between them and their allies in the United States and Western Europe were not strong enough for a real commitment to those pledges that such an alliance would require. This was particularly true since the generals who carried out the 1980 coup were the same generals who were subjected to the indignity of the U.S. military embargo in 1977, that is, before they came to power. At that time Washington had reminded them of the extent to which the Turkish army depended on U.S. weapons. These were the same generals who, after coming to power, were described by Europe as barbaric, oppressive and anti-democratic.

It was therefore logical for Turkey to turn to the south to get out of its predicament between the East and the West. Turkey's movement toward its "new friends" was becoming more pronounced even as Ankara's bitterness toward its old friends was becoming more profound.

The new friends were actually quite willing to welcome these new directions that Turkey was pursuing. On the one hand, Turkey's prolonged absence from Islamic action did not strengthen either Turkey or the Islamic world. On the other hand, developments in the balances of power in the Gulf could be positive if that new factor were introduced into the strategic map of the area.

The permanent flaw in Washington's relations with the Middle East dominated the configuration of political interests in the Gulf. This is because in formulating its Middle East policy, the United States had separated the question of security in the Gulf from the Palestinian question, even though these two questions are inseparable by virtue of the facts in the area itself. This separation is the principal reason that impelled Gulf citizens to question the "practical" limits of the United States' interest in the security of the Gulf.

Also, the United States' "traditional" policy, which Arab efforts have failed to change, meant that, to the citizens of that area, Washington had placed itself on the side of the Gulf citizens' most vicious enemies. How then can "a story" about the White House's interest in the security of the Gulf states be written when the practical implications of American policy belie that?

And after all that--or perhaps before all that--comes the nature of the strategic balance between the two superpowers. This balance is not confined to the notion of secure borders for each superpower; it rather extends to include any changes that may occur on the political map of the world.

If it is logical to argue that the existence of one of the superpowers is a principal ingredient in shaping the policy of the other superpower, then it is also logical for the Gulf states to refuse to have the area become a bargaining chip between the two superpowers. That would make the notion of strategic security dependent upon such bargaining processes, and it would place the area's security out of reach of those who would be exposed to direct danger if that strategic security were to be damaged one day.

Thus, the soil in the Gulf and the soil in Turkey were producing similar flowers that called upon each country to turn toward the other. Does this mean, however, that the road from Turkey to the Arab world has become quite smooth?

One can show the need to deal deliberately with the question of building Arab-Turkish cooperation on the grounds of the Islamic ties between the two parties by highlighting an important set of political "items."

The first "item" has to do with the fact that Turkey is located near the lines of battle between Iran and Iraq. It also has to do with the stability of the eastern provinces where 8 million Kurds live. Those Kurds have close ties with Kurds in Iran and in Iraq.

These provinces were among the first areas in Turkey where martial law was applied, even before the military coup in the fall of 1980. Permanent Turkish

forces are still stationed there; without these forces the stability of the area cannot be assured.

That stability, however, also depends on what happens across the borders. This may be what drove Turkish forces to expand their area of operations all the way to the northern borders with Iraq.

The significance of the fact that Kurds are the common denominator between Turkey, Iran and Iraq is that the three countries have a common interest in coordinating their efforts to defuse the separatist calls that are being promoted by 12 extremist groups operating across the borders of all three countries.

The second "item" has to do with the waters of the Euphrates. According to a report that AL-HAWADITH has received recently, this question has once again returned to hold a principal position with regard to the open-door policy between Turks and Arabs.

The question had surfaced in 1972 when the first dispute between Syria and Turkey arose over Turkey's use of increasing quantities of water from the northern channel of the river. That had reduced the water level in the channel of the river which flows through Syrian territory.

Because no solution has been found to the problem, Syria asked the countries of the Gulf to refrain from financing the Ataturk Dam Project, which Turkey is building on the Euphrates River, until a final agreement is reached on sharing the waters of the river between Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

After refusing to engage in any talks about the river with Turkey and Iraq, Syria has called recently for a trilateral meeting to discuss the rights of the three countries and to form a common organization that would have the right to make decisions to solve this or any problem that may develop in the future.

The third item is that Ankara is still experiencing a conflict between two points of view. One of them minimizes the importance of the doors that have been opened between Turks and Arabs. Proponents of this point of view argue that there is no ideological justification for this new trend other than the Islamic bond. They consider such a justification to be "a betrayal" of Kemal Ataturk's secular legacy.

In fact, an important report from Ankara indicates that opponents of Turkey's minister of foreign affairs, who is known for leaning toward the Arabs, tried recently to have him removed from office because he was originally an "Arab" and not a pure Turk.

The fourth item has to do with attempts to set pre-conditions that both Arabs and Turks have to meet before developing their relations with each other. Arabs declare that Ankara has to break its relations with Israel, and Turks declare that Arabs have to recognize the Northern Republic of Cyprus, or in other words break relations with Greece.

Turks respond to these conditions by declaring that their relations with Israel have been frozen since 1967. They say that breaking relations altogether could

cause the Zionist lobby and the Greek lobby to join efforts in the U.S. Congress. Turks say this is something that Ankara has to avoid, at least at the present time. The Arabs, however, respond by saying that recognizing the Northern Republic of Cyprus may cost them relative Greek support for Arab causes. They say that present conditions do not in any way demand haste in making such a decision.

Despite all these details, the road remains quite open to the development of Arab-Turkish relations. These relations will continue to make progress because the Arab-Turkish weapons industry will include--as information available to AL-HAWADITH indicates--more than one Arab party. This is because Turkey has a relatively advanced technology in this regard, and because Israel is concentrating all its efforts on developing its own military industry.

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CHALLENGES FACING ARAB BANKS EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 391, 18 Aug 84 pp 57-58

[Article: "Domestic and Foreign Challenges Facing Arab Banks in the Gulf"]

[Text] How will Arab banks face the post oil boom period and the shrinking budgets of Gulf states?

Prospects for bank business prescribe a general review of strategic plans including raising the standard of management, services and foreign operations.

Several questions have come to the fore recently about the role of Arab banks on the domestic and international scenes. Some of the questions have to do with future expectations for these banks in the period that will follow the oil boom when the budgets of the Gulf states shrink and syndicated money lending markets are depressed.

This article reviews the most important developments in Arab banking with regard to the results of 1983 and the strategies that are being followed by Arab banks in general and by Gulf banks in particular.

Annual reports for 1983 about various Gulf banks indicate that it would be difficult to draw general conclusions about the performance of these banks with regard to changes in their total assets and profits. In 1983 Kuwaiti banks, for example, achieved good results. The rate of change in their assets was between 1.3 percent and 23 percent. By the end of 1983 the total combined budget of commercial banks was about 9.990 billion Kuwaiti dinars. That was an increase of 9.3 percent, compared with about 20 percent for 1982.

Combined profits in commercial banks declined in 1983 by 10 percent, compared with the previous year. The National Bank had the highest rate of increase, which is about 15 percent, while profits at the Kuwaiti Financing Firm declined 68.8 percent because of the overall stagnation in the economy. It is known that in Kuwait banks do not publish all the profits they realize in a fiscal year since some of the profits are transferred into reserves before they are declared. This is done to cover suspicious debts and shore up supplies.

It is worth noting that the 1983 results for Kuwaiti banks began to reflect some

of the pressures that have resulted from the crisis of al-Manakh Market, the continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran and the government's austere spending policies in various economic sectors. It is expected that these results will affect 1984 profits because of the continued economic stagnation and because of other reasons mentioned earlier.

Although the total assets of most Saudi banks grew, the declared profits for 1983 declined, compared with the level of profits for the previous year.

The Saudi Monetary Foundation had announced several decisions whose purpose was to protect the local banking market from foreign competition. The foundation was particularly interested in protection from offshore units in Bahrain. These decisions were also made to reduce the use of the Saudi riyal in exchanges and international banking operations.

The decline in the profits of Saudi banks is due to several factors, one of which is the declining demand for loans. This is due to the government's austere spending measures in some sectors, and it is also due to increased expenses for administration and expansion, especially because bank branches have been opened. That is followed by increased expenses for training Saudi employees and for using modern electronic devices to automate many banking operations.

Bank results in Bahrain indicate that performance in 1983 was different. The discrepancy was evident in the rate of change in declared profits, compared with the previous year. Bahrain's local as well as offshore banks were affected by the decline in the area's oil returns and by the effects that decline has had on the deficits in the budgets of the Gulf Cooperation Council. On the other hand the crisis of Kuwait's al-Manakh Market and also the continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran had a profound impact on short-term profits and on the long-term future outlook of these institutions. In addition, Saudi Arabia's aforementioned decisions increased restrictions on the business offshore banks do with Saudi institutions and with the regional lending market. It is expected that these developments will have a negative effect on bank profits in Bahrain and on the survival possibilities for some banks in the Gulf area as a whole.

The performance of banks in the United Arab Emirates was also mixed because there were numerous questions about what was taking place in the markets of the United Arab Emirates in general and in the banking sector in particular. After the Central Bank took over the United Bank for the Middle East, there were many rumors about the possibility that other banks may fail. Although authorized agencies issued numerous decrees aimed at correcting banking practices, observers believe that some operating banks have profound problems, particularly because these banks had expanded their practice of extending loans and easy terms to members of their boards of directors. Many of those board members then failed to pay back the loans because they had invested in Kuwait's al-Manakh Market or had taken part in local projects that were losing money. It is expected that these negative developments will create many victims and that many commercial and industrial firms will fail. Some small banks will be merged together to avoid failure and to avoid further setbacks and the flight of capital.

Directions for the Coming Stage: The results for 1983 indicate that instability and the profound economic stagnation that the economy in the Gulf is suffering

from have gradually begun showing their effects on the profits of some Arab financial institutions. Growing instability will also have a more profound effect on 1984 and perhaps 1985 profits if the war between Iraq and Iran does not end and if, consequently, the pressures on the budgets of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council grow and arms expenditures increase.

It is therefore expected that the next stage in the development of Arab banking institutions will be one in which the weak will be eliminated and the strong will survive. The survivors will be not only those institutions that are strong as far as capital and reserves are concerned, but they will also be ones that have a high-level management whose vision of the future will enable them to overcome difficulties and make decisions that are based on well-considered strategic plans.

In talking about the next stage in the development of Arab banks, we must touch upon the objectives and strategies of central banks as well as financial, commercial and other investment institutions.

1. Central Banks: The measures of central banks in the area regarding commercial banks' operations will become more strict, particularly in the following matters:

--Extending loans and easy terms to members of boards of directors.

--Interest rates payable on deposits and charged for loans.

--Increased protection for local banks from competition by foreign banks to maintain a certain rate of profits in the wake of shrinking local opportunities for lending money and investing funds.

--Some restrictions will be placed on the involvement of commercial banks in international operations or in remittances that encourage the flight of capital.

--The increase in the number of unprofitable domestic branches will be checked to reduce expenses and the impact of losing in competition.

--The absence of competent technicians and administrators in central banks will increase the difficulty of understanding fiscal policies and the objectives that are being sought from the decisions that are made by authorized agencies.

Decisions that were made recently in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates indicate that it is possible to place restrictions on banking operations in local money markets.

2. Commercial and Investment Banks: Arab financial institutions will be pre-occupied in the next stage with the growing competition in domestic markets at a time when local demand for borrowing is declining. These developments are occurring simultaneously with a sharp decline in international lending activity.

Those institutions that understand the gravity of the situation are expected to do the following:

--They are to review their strategic plans or begin preparing such plans if they were not familiar with them previously. This review is to be carried out so that the most important economic and financial indicators in the environment where they will be operating can be re-evaluated. Afterwards they are to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses that will affect performance in that environment. After that, they are to clarify the objectives of the strategies that are to be followed to achieve those objectives.

Many Arab banks paid no attention to drafting long-term strategic plans because of the favorable conditions that local markets had been experiencing with abundant oil resturns and numerous local opportunities for lending and investing. However, recent developments in both the local and international markets have shown the importance of planning.

--These institutions are to pay attention to improving management standards and upgrading the standard of operations that are carried out by Arab banks. This can be done by making the local training courses that are offered by international financial institutions more intense. One of the most important challenges that banks are facing to overcome the high cost of operations and to be able to compete with foreign financial institutions is that of providing management that is aware and trained manpower.

--These institutions are to devote attention to raising the level of banking services which are offered to local clients. They are to do this by introducing new financial tools and automated banking services. In addition, they are to increase service hours and to improve and modernize their branches. Using modern technical systems and making adjustments to a new level of technology will have positive effects on the standard of services that are offered.

--These institutions are to concentrate on managing the sources of funds, that is, deposits and other sources, instead of concentrating only on methods of using these resources in loans and investments. They are to ensure stable sources for the currencies they need at a reasonable cost that would enable them to keep a reasonable margin of profit.

--These institutions are to increase their efforts to expand their operations abroad by establishing representative centers or affiliate firms or branches in international financial centers. The decline in lending and investment opportunities in the local market will force more Arab banks to set up branches and affiliate firms outside their borders so as to serve their customers abroad and expand the range of their operations. It is expected that these institutions will give special attention to increasing their ability to provide specialized services in the areas of investment and commercial and real estate counseling.

8592

CSO: 4404/664

PROPOSED UNION OF MOROCCO, LIBYA DISCUSSED

Casablanca LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION in French 29 Aug-5 Sep 84 pp 18-20

[Article by Mustapha Sehim: "The Union of Morocco and Libya and International Law"]

[Text] The treaty signed on 13 August 1984 at Oujda between King Hassan II and President Mu'ammr Qadhdhafi has the purpose of establishing a "Union of States between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." Under the terms of Article 16, the treaty is to enter into effect after its approval by a referendum of the people of each of the two countries. Apart from its contents and its particularly political significance, this treaty presents a certain number of juridical aspects which we would like to examine here.

First of all there is this point: what is a union of states? We could begin by considering this form of association of states in comparison with other forms such as a federation. A federal state is an association of states which agree to constitute a common entity, a federation. The federation, which is provided with the characteristics of a state, superimposes distinct, state-like institutions on its members: at the lower level there are the member or federated states; at the higher level there is the federal state itself. However, we should add that the federated states, although they have a certain amount of autonomy in the management of their affairs, also participate in the process of decision making in the union. Finally, the federal state is the only one which exists from the international point of view. In this respect it possesses--and exclusively so, moreover--the attributes of a state.

Neither Federation Nor Confederation

On the other hand a union of states should be distinguished from a confederation of states. Of course, the latter involves entities which are called confederated states. However, it does not superimpose a confederated state on them. In other words a confederation is similar to a strengthened alliance. It is established by treaty. Decisions are made by a body generally called the Diet, which approves legislation on a unanimous and ad referendum basis. That is, with the reservation that the proposed legislation or decision is subject to subsequent confirmation by the governments of the member states. That is why a confederation does not tend

to create a higher state identity. Moreover, international law does not recognize that it has a specific international personality.

Under these circumstances we can see why the treaty between Morocco and Libya establishing a union of states does not fit in with either of the two forms of state organization indicated above. It relates to another form of state: a union of states. In this respect we should distinguish between a personal union and a real union. A personal union, we should point out, is now an obsolete political form. Historically, such a union has been the result of applying laws turning over the authority of the crown in this or that European country. For example, in the 19th century there was a personal union between England and Hanover (between 1814 and 1837) or between Holland and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (1815-1890), to mention only these two cases.

From the point of view of constitutional law a real union exists when two states have a certain number of institutions in common. This form of state takes its inspiration from the idea of federalism, and some authors even consider that it is a lesser form of federalism. From the point of view of international law any group of states forming a political entity which is clearly distinct within the international community is regarded as a union of states. However, we should point out immediately that the union of states, however, does not constitute a new state. It is no less true that it should be considered as much more than the kind of political liaison resulting from an alliance.

Without attempting to present an exhaustive treatment of the subject three fundamental principles should be set down: the principle of sovereignty, the principle of union, and the principle of solidarity.

The Principle of Sovereignty

The principle of sovereignty implies that each of the two states retains its own powers and that each continues to exercise them without any interference by the organs of the union. In other words, Morocco and Libya continue, within their respective territorial limits, to exercise their own powers and their own fundamental rules. We repeat that from this point of view the union of states does not constitute a new state nor a constitutionally superior order of things to which Morocco and Libya as states would be subordinate. On the contrary, the union of states is limited to a political community provided with joint institutions subject to the exclusive authority of the executive powers of the union, which are exercised by the two chiefs of state.

Moreover, this principle of sovereignty is reaffirmed in Article 11 of the Treaty of Oujda, in the following terms: "While respecting each other's sovereignty without any reservations, each of the two states commits itself not to intervene in any way whatever in the internal affairs of the other state." In passing we should note the phrase, "without any reservations." This means that the respect for the sovereignty of each of the two states is an absolute principle. There is nothing particularly astonishing about that to the extent that the principle of the sovereign equality of the two states is thus specifically extended to its corollary: the principle of non-intervention.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the union does not limit in any way the capacity for diplomatic action by each of the states. Thus, under the terms of Article 13 this union is not limited to itself but, quite to the contrary, is open to the international community. On the one hand, in effect, the union does not exclude the possibility for each of the contracting parties to conclude other, similar agreements with other states. On the other hand third parties, whether Arab or African states, will be able to join this union, provided their candidacies have the support of Morocco and Libya.

Sovereignty and Union

The principle of the union raised by Article 1 of the Treaty of Oujda does not imply the abandonment of any portion of sovereignty. This principle means that the two, united states propose to work for the achievement of common policies in the areas defined in Article 9 of the treaty. In this regard the areas involved concern in particular close diplomatic cooperation, the strengthening of economic relations, and the extension of cultural and technical cooperation.

However, the treaty does not limit itself to defining these objectives. In fact it goes much further because it sets out the organic means which should be employed to achieve this purpose. Thus, several of the provisions of the treaty define the structures to be established.

The first of these, which has already been set up, is the presiding organ of the union. Under Article 2 this is defined as the supreme organ of the union. This function is jointly exercised by King Hassan II and Libyan President Qadhdhafi. Regarding the presidency, two comments should be made. The first of these is that the presidency is the center for decision making and for the implementation of the policy of the union. The second comment deals with the fact that the presidency is a two-headed organ. The two chiefs of state, in this case King Hassan II and President Qadhdhafi, jointly, exclusively, and fully assume the presidency of this union. Exclusively, because the treaty provides no procedure or organ to replace the presidency of this union. Fully, because the decision making power of the presidency is not shared with any other organ.

The Consultative Role of the Mixed Organs

It is true that a certain number of mixed organs are provided for under Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the treaty. However, they only have a consultative role. The councils defined in Article 4 include the defense, economic, cultural, and technical councils. They have the tasks of studying questions submitted to them by the presidency and proposing solutions. The assembly of the union is made up of the members of the Moroccan Parliament and the members of the General People's Congress of the Libyan Jamahirya. The assembly simply has the power to submit recommendations to the presidency. The executive committee of the union is composed of the Moroccan cabinet and the Libyan General People's Committee. This is a kind of executive authority and is charged with the implementation of the decisions of the presidency. There remains the case of the permanent secretariat. The treaty says nothing about its powers, and we may think--until we have more information on the matter--that it will only be an administrative organ, unless the presidency decides to give it a more political character. This is its probable

evolution, since it is true that the institutional activity of other organs will naturally push it in this direction.

The Implications of Solidarity

The principle of solidarity is a fundamental aspect of the union. It seems to me that this principle runs through the entire treaty establishing the union, and it therefore affects several of its provisions. More specifically, this principle of solidarity covers at least two aspects: political and diplomatic matters and economic objectives.


Regarding the first form of solidarity between the two countries mentioned above, the formulation of Article 12 is of considerable importance: "Any aggression against one of the two states would constitute aggression against the other." Several consequences flow from this provision: first of all, there is a commitment for mutual assistance in case of aggression. Secondly, it might be thought that this article provides for solidarity in terms of defense and collective security involving the two members of the union. It thus establishes a territorial space for the common defense against any aggression. It sets up between the two states a de facto form of solidarity based on a common destiny affecting the Maghreb [Northwest Africa], Arab, and African areas.

However, it should be emphasized here that Article 12 does not constitute either a "war machine" or an "axis" directed against anyone. It simply refers to a mutual obligation to render assistance to the other party. Moreover, the legitimacy of such provisions has been recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. In fact the U. N. Charter, in Chapter VIII, specifically devoted to "Regional Agreements," recognizes in Article 52 the legitimacy "of arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action." Now, it seems to me that such provisions may properly be applied to the Treaty of Oujda.

This treaty did not resolve any Moroccan-Libyan conflict: none existed. Its essential object, as the treaty itself emphasizes in its policy preamble, is: "to participate in the safeguarding of peace" and "to contribute to the unification of the Arab Maghreb and, on that basis, to the achievement of the unity of the Arab nation." In other words, the treaty of union does not provide a solution to eventual, bilateral disputes. Quite to the contrary, it sets up the objective of working for the settlement of Maghrebian and inter-Arab problems. And in this respect it fully responds to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as defined in Chapter I of the U. N. Charter: the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations between states, contributing to the achievement of international cooperation, and the sovereign equality of the members.

Regarding the second form of solidarity, this involves economic solidarity. It would be appropriate to emphasize here that the treaty provides in Article 9 that the union will have operational and development budgets. That is something with which to promote close relations between two fraternal countries. However, that also leaves great potentialities open in the field of economic cooperation, on a fruitful and mutually advantageous basis, for the welfare and the progress of the two peoples.

Table: The Institutional Structure of the Moroccan-Libyan Union of States



5170
CSO: 4519/8

COMMENTS ON PRO-ARMENIAN STATEMENTS MADE IN U.S. ELECTION

GF151749 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 22 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "In the Name of Truth"]

[Excerpts] Once every few years, from one election to the next, whether parliamentary or presidential, the democracy which has considerably lost its ideological and moral depth is crucified in the West, causing great disappointment and resentment not only for the peoples of the countries concerned but also for the people who hang their hopes on democracy.

The political world is passing through a similar stage these days as the U.S. presidential election campaign has stepped into its most vigorous period. Not only the presidential candidates themselves, but also the powers endeavoring for their success and the parties and influential political circles, are making promises and renewing pledges to support just causes, which in the final account are not realized because of the limits of pre-election statements and which only serve to mar democracy a little bit more.

It is not possible to keep the Armenian people out of this atmosphere, just as statements made in favor of our just cause are seriously followed by Armenians all over the world. Recent proof of this fact is the promising decision of the U.S. House of Representatives. This decision, which was adopted unanimously by vote, declares 24 April 1984 "the national day to mark the inhumanity of one human against another" in order to respect the memory of the Armenian genocide martyrs.

There is no doubt that this expression of respect made by the House of Representatives of a country having such a capacity as the United States will find its appropriate place in the rich historic list of pro-Armenian statements. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in the past 5 or 6 months a number of such statements have been made in favor of the Armenians.

Even President Reagan himself accepted the visit of an Armenian delegation and praised the contribution of Armenians to American life, stressing the value of preserving the Armenian identity. The date 24 April 1984 was regarded as an appropriate occasion by the Democratic Party presidential candidates, Mondale and Jackson, to address their word of respect to the Armenian people, who have witnessed much sufferings, by condemning the crime of the Armenian massacre and demanding the just solution for the Armenian cause. Moreover, during their

national conventions the two rival parties allocated a stage to our Armenian cause committees in the United States in order to make the necessary assessment of the national and political voice of the Armenian Americans from that stage.

It is useless to extend the list. It is an election campaign year and nobody wants to ignore the necessity of gaining the support and trust of the Armenian electors in the United States. In the final account they all are pre-election statements which often are forgotten as soon as the curtain comes down and the election campaign is finished. At its best their statements are of a moral nature, and even if they are respected they stay within that same limit and have no place in the national policy.

The proof for this is that 4 years ago presidential candidate Reagan himself, and before him in 1976, presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, on their election campaign road to reach the White House, made promises to support the Armenian cause, but forgot all that during their presidential term. They continued their traditional U.S. policy of supporting the Turkish Government and with all indifference ignored the anti-Armenian measures by the Turks. President Reagan in particular has held an exceptional attitude in this regard. During his term not only the turbid U.S. policy to classify the newest Armenian liberation movements in the ranks of the international terrorism was intensified, or the attitude to condemn the Armenian terrorists and to express condolences to the Turkish Government was escalated, but also the propagandist immorality of considering the fact of the Armenian massacre as doubtful was witnessed.

No, we do not have illusions. We cannot ignore the condition that even the pre-election statements in favor of the Armenians are being made in such an atmosphere when the U.S. media and public opinion are prejudiced against the demands of the Armenians; are ready to label the Armenians struggling for justice as criminals; are ready to excuse the unjust life sentence issued against Sasunyan; and finally are inclined to mar the name of Armenians on the occasion of an assault carried out by a U.S. policeman during the Olympic Games.

Similarly, we cannot ignore the fact that all these statements, or pre-election pledges, fully lack clarification of the real criminal, the basic effort to reveal the side which perpetrated the Armenian massacre and the establishment of the political core of the Armenian cause.

This is why it is necessary to affirm that these pro-Armenian statements do not have even a moral nature and are only the result of the constant efforts of the Armenian cause commissions to make the voice of the Armenians heard. They are based on election accounts designed to respect the civil and national power of the Armenians. The rest are only non-serious expression of democracy which can have notable significance only with the constant pursuit of the organized power of the Armenians.

Only through the strengthening of this power and working with corresponding clear vision is it possible to impose pressure so that the thing given to us with one hand is not immediately usurped with the other.

GAS PRODUCTION, DEBT SERVICING; AGRICULTURAL, POPULATION GROWTH

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French No 650, Mar 84 pp 24-27

[Article by R.T.]

Text On the African continent where most countries, struck by world crisis and drought, are experiencing sizable budget deficits, balance of payments troubles, and serious increases in foreign indebtedness, Algeria's improvement of its financial situation is at stake. Despite an appreciable drop in its crude oil exports, it is striving to reduce its foreign debt.

As in all socialist countries, Algerian authorities refrain from publishing certain figures which would permit overall assessment of the financial situation, particularly those on the balance of payments and foreign debt. Last April Finance Minister Boualem Benhammouda would say only that "the favorable balance of payments trend has allowed the cadence of foreign debt servicing to be maintained, which has made possible a sharp reduction in the ratio of that debt." This positive trend results particularly from stringent imports control and from reduced spending for technical assistance decided on as early as 1980.

To carry out investments provided for in the second 4-year plan (1974-77) and for 2 years thereafter, Algeria had contracted many loans, so that its foreign debt had grown rapidly to reach the record figure of over \$18 billion--about half its GNP--in 1978, according to estimates by international financial institutions. According to unofficial information the debt had been reduced to \$14.5 billion by the end of 1983, and now represents less than 30 percent of GNP (estimated at \$45 billion), thus making Algeria a "good risk" compared to many developing countries. Since 1980 the country has not borrowed on the international market, and the clearly predominant role of private banks has been notably reduced in favor of supplier credits under more advantageous conditions. Still according to unofficial information, Algeria is striving not to exceed a total foreign indebtedness of \$15 billion, and has endeavored for several months to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves, which had fallen from slightly over \$3 billion to about \$1.5 billion, by reducing consumer goods imports--computed at over \$1 billion in 1983.

Stabilization of the external financial situation was attained in great part by a very considerable improvement in the trade balance, which largely compensated for a deterioration in the balance of services. Paradoxically, it came during a period (1980-83) when crude oil export earnings were reduced by half. That was because Algeria was able to achieve a very judicious diversification and valorization of its hydrocarbons, whose sale abroad still accounts for almost all its exports, or exactly 98.2 percent of their value in 1982 and 98.1 percent in 1981. The drop in crude oil exports was largely offset by a considerable growth in value and volume of condensates, natural gas, and refined petroleum products. Minister of Energy and Chemical and Petrochemical Industries Belkacem Nabi recently stated that turnover in the hydrocarbons sector had risen from 81 to 87 billion dinars from 1982 to 1983, or 7 percent, while prices dropped by 17 percent in March 1983.

Good Results in Energy Sector for 1983

The periodical ALGERIE ENERGIE, published by the ministry, recently published an article on concrete results attained by the energy sector in 1983 which provides precise figures on the diversification of this sector already emphasized above. Crude oil production for 1983 was 31.3 million tons, or 7 percent below 1982. Since the beginning of the 5-year plan of 1980-84, the average annual decrease in production levels has been approximately 13 percent. Compared to 1979 production levels, the reduction in the rate of crude oil extraction has allowed a "saving" of nearly 60 million tons, or practically three years' supply for the national refineries.

Concerning condensates, the performance of the Hassi R'Mel gas installations, and mastery of reinjection technique, have made it possible to extract 13.6 million tons at that facility, or an 11 percent increase over 1982. Total production from all deposits reached 14.2 million tons.

Gross total natural gas production, associated and nonassociated, reached 89.8 billion cubic m, for a 9.5 percent increase over 1982. Half of that production was reinjected into deposits (45 billion m³, including 37 billion at Hassi R'Mel). The volume of flared gas fell by 9 percent, and now represent but 4.9 percent of gross production. By contrast with 1979, when quantities of flared gas were at their maximum of 10 billion m³, the progressive growth of recuperation capacity has allowed a saving of 14.5 billion m³, or nearly three times the quantities taken by Sonelgaz in 1983 for its needs (power stations and clients).

Quantities of LPG [liquefied petroleum gas] extracted in hydrocarbon fields reached 2.2 million tons in 1983, to equal 1982 production. Over half that production, or 59 percent, was recycled into natural gas. With entry into service of the "Jumbo LPG" facility at Arzew, expected in 1984, most of that LPG will be transported to the new complex. Commercial LPG production totals nearly 1.5 million tons, of which 44 percent comes from separation units (primary LPG), 36 percent from the refining sector, and 20 percent from the liquefaction sector.

Quantities of crude oil delivered to national refineries rose to 18 million tons, or more than 57 percent of the nation's crude oil production.

Fuel production reached 16.8 million tons, an 8 percent decrease from 1982. That drop, which was taken into consideration in setting planned objectives, is explained by the anticipated shutdown of the Skikda refinery owing to a survey of reserves by the builder. In addition, a strong increase was noted in asphalt production, which rose by over 59 percent, or from 116,000 tons in 1982 to 184,000 tons in 1983.

Production of lubricants also rose, by 15 percent, to reach 47,000 tons in 1983. In the case of this product, existing production capacity, which totaled 525,000 tons by the end of 1983, was still insufficient to meet national consumption, which represents nearly three times that capacity. Entry into production by the Arzew II lubricants facility, with an output of 120,500 tons, will considerably reduce that shortfall.

Production of liquefied natural gas showed a considerable increase, amounting to 52.6 percent over 1982, to reach 25,939,000 m³ of LNG, or the equivalent of 15.6 billion m³ in the gaseous state. The rate of internal consumption of natural gas by liquefaction units, taken as a whole, was estimated at 24 percent of entering quantities in 1983.

The same issue of ALGERIE ENERGIE indicates that electric power production rose from 8,136 GWh in 1982 to 8,926 GWh in 1983, an increase of 10 percent. Thermal-based techniques accounted for 96 percent of that production (of which 53 percent was by steam turbines using natural gas + fuel, and 43 percent by gas turbines), with hydraulics and diesel accounting, respectively, for 3 percent and 1 percent of total production.

Natural gas purchases from SONATRACH rose to 46.380 million thermies, or 5 billion m³ in gaseous equivalent. More than half, or 58 percent of those orders, were for consumption by electric power stations. Sales to consumers (at high, medium, and low pressures), which account for 40 percent of orders, are 9.7 percent above last year's.

Day to Day Problems

Those satisfying results, attained despite the currently depressed state of the world oil market, go hand in hand with a policy of stringency and austerity in budgetary matters, as well as in matters affecting the population's living conditions. The 5-year plan of 1980-84 had numbered improvement of those conditions--a factor neglected by prior plans in favor of frantic industrialization--among its priorities, and there has been undeniable progress. Major shortages, particularly of food products, have disappeared, and an urban development effort is underway in large cities, as in Algiers. Nevertheless, owing to the exodus from rural areas and to the resulting growth of urban populations, housing and transportation are still severe problems in large urban centers. Consumer prices remain high, and

some items are available only periodically or irregularly. Drinking water is precious, and restrictions are imposed on its use, especially in summer. In villages the lack of sanitation, due in part to a lack of public spirit by residents and merchants, is deplored.

The press reflects those vexations of daily life, and we shall cite only a few examples taken at random from the big national daily EL MOUDJAHID over the past few months. During the last two weeks of Ramadan, and despite all steps by responsible agencies, the situation in consumer markets rapidly disintegrated, resulting in shortages and price increases. Obtaining a supply of fruit and vegetables was almost a tour de force. The newspaper condemns the "indefensible frenzy" of consumers, their "passion to buy," "waste," and speculation. During the same period a news story told of a laborer for a community association who could not buy fruit at prices "bordering on the black market": 40 dinars for a kg of cherries--or his entire daily wage, and 30 dinars for a kg of peaches (1 dinar = 1.73 Fr at the estimated exchange rate for January 1984). As soon as the cafes open people throng at the door, proprietors find it difficult to obtain adequate supplies of carbonated beverages, and they must give large tips to suppliers. Many stories complain of "favoritism" in stores and shopping centers, and of the indifference of salespeople. Another story recalls that automobile spare parts often cannot be found in commercial channels, but are sold at exorbitant prices on the black market. One news item tells at length of a smuggling operation: police in Oran seized a truck containing 2,140 wallets, 5,184 tins of Nivea cream, 245 ladies' belts, and 240 tubes of Wala hair cream; and in a warehouse 68 pairs of foreign-made shoes, and 150 pairs of Levis. It can be concluded that those diverse but common items are rare in Algeria, or sold for high prices on the lawful market. It appears from those few examples, again taken at random from the Algiers press, that Algerians have in the past few years become a consumer society, but that product distribution and availability still often leave much to be desired. The stringent control of consumer goods imports, noted above, is not calculated to improve the situation.

The 1985-1989 Plan: Priority to Agriculture

The 1985-1989 plan, which like its predecessors will set economic and social goals for 5 years ahead, was adopted early in July by the government and will be presented in a few weeks to the popular assembly. It stresses the orientations laid down in 1980. Whereas earlier plans emphasized heavy industry, the forthcoming one gives priority to agriculture and water power, while a sizable portion of mobilized resources will be devoted to economic and social infrastructures, housing, education, and training. The FLN central committee last May stressed Algeria's need to "reduce its dependence on foods from abroad" and to that end advocated better use of land in the High Plateau region; broader mobilization of financial, material, and human resources to improve agricultural production; and more substantial aid to farmers--particularly to those in the private sector. For all that, industry is not neglected, since the plan provides for development of processing activities, and for promotion of subcontracting.

The next plan includes a program for "systematic research and development of subsoil resources, and for prospecting for new energy sources." This confirms the concern of responsible Algerian officials with the need to reduce the enormous part played by hydrocarbons in earning export revenue.

Two Questions

Although diversification of hydrocarbons and large natural gas reserves--with gas constituting 80 percent and oil 20 percent of reserves--seem to assure Algeria's medium-term economic future, two questions arise which are to some extent related: population growth and political evolution.

Algeria's population has one of the fastest natural growth rates in the world. Estimated at 18.33 million in 1980, it should reach, according to projections: 21.8 million in 1985; 24.41 in 1990; 28.09 in 1995; and 32.22 by the dawn of the 21st century. Today, 44.5 percent of Algerians are under 15. One can imagine the problems raised in terms of housing, medical care, food supply, education, and--later on--of employment, by that mass of children which grows each year. Will resources keep pace with rising needs? Hence this population growth is of major concern to the government today. Its control has become an abiding aspect of the government's economic and social policy. The FLN central committee has recommended implementation of a concrete birth control program, particularly including a widespread information campaign and strengthening of specialized birth control measures. Will it be possible to modify the population growth curve, before the end of the century, by changing minds? That may be doubted in a country where the child is king, as stressed by Paul Balta in a recent LE MONDE article, and where every birth--even among the poor--is considered a blessing, so that families of 6, 8, and 10 children are widespread, to the pride of parents.

The second question relates to our political future. Next November 1 Algeria will brilliantly mark the 30th anniversary of the beginning of its armed struggle for independence. The leadership is indeed carefully nurturing the memory of that struggle, and everywhere martyrs and heroes of independence are glorified, as are the leaders who earlier opposed French conquest. The prestige earned by that armed struggle has, moreover, been of great service to Algeria in its accession to a choice position in the Third World. But the ranks of veterans are starting to thin out. Today 55 percent of the population were born after 1962--after independence. Among them, obviously, are to be found Algeria's future leaders and statesmen. As everywhere else in the world, their ideas and conduct will no longer be those of their elders. No doubt they will yearn for more freedom. When Algeria's two neighbors--Morocco long since and Tunisia more recently--have accepted multi-party systems, can it remain much longer under a regime with a single party and a single official truth? Youth represents the great unknown.

Table 1. Crude Oil Production in Millions of Tons

<u>Producer</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>Variation (%)</u> <u>1983-1982</u>
SONATRACH	36.966	37.157	33.180	31.019	- 6.51
Associates	10.253	.521	.344	.275	-20.06
TOTAL	47.219	37.678	33.542	31.294	- 6.70

Table 2. Natural Gas Production in Billions of Cubic Meters

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>Variation (%)</u> <u>1983-1982</u>
Associated gas	15.552	11.751	10.144	10.178	+ 0.34
Nonassociated gas	27.875	53.691	71.911	79.668	+10.79
(including Hassi R'mel dry gas)	(21.388)	(45.700)	(63.061)	(70.736)	(+12.17)
Total production	43.427	65.442	82.055	89.846	+ 9.40
Reinjection	14.366	34.085	47.540	45.079	- 5.18
(including Hassi R'mel)	(6.240)	(26.644)	(39.725)	(37.311)	- 6.08
Flaring	9.714	6.729	4.813	4.370	- 9.20
(including Hassi R'mel)	(.187)	(.172)	(.193)	(.197)	+ 2.07

Table 3. Exports (u = 10^3 tons, except for LNG in 10^3 m^3 and natural gas in 10^6 m^3)

<u>Product</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>Variation (%)</u> <u>1983-1982</u>
Crude oil	30.648	32.776	26.550	24.887	- 6.26
& byproducts					
Condensate	3.989	8.953	12.414	13.339	+ 7.45
LNG	10.597	11.801	16.668	25.928	+55.56
Natural gas	--	--	--	--	--
LPG	421	615	877	626	-28.62
Petrochemicals	52	74	92	66	-28.26
(ethylene + methanol)					

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MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE DISCUSSES SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM

Cairo AL-'AMAL in Arabic No 256, Sep 84 pp 20-22, 57

[Article by 'Adil Himam: "The Problems, Issues and Achievements of the Agriculture Sector in Egypt"]

[Text] When we asked Dr Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture and self-sufficiency in food, if we could hold this conversation with him, we were prompted to do so by numerous considerations and justifications, foremost, of course, the extreme importance the sector of agriculture holds for Egypt and its national economy. It was also necessary, as we were on the point of celebrating the 32nd anniversary of the issuance of the first agrarian reform law in Egypt on 9 September 1952, which has been chosen as an annual holiday for the Egyptian peasant, that we seize on this occasion to present the top person in charge of agriculture in Egypt with some issues which now receive a great amount of attention, in order also to ascertain the achievements and projects which have been carried out.

Self-Sufficiency in Crops

I asked, "Let us start, your excellency the minister, with an important, essential issue connected to a hope and goal to which we all aspire, which is the realization of self-sufficiency in crops in the light of the great increase in the volume of our imports of foodstuffs from abroad. To what extent is it possible to realize this goal?"

Dr Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture and self sufficiency in food, said:

"The fact is that this issue is of the utmost importance. Therefore, we have given it priority in agricultural development strategy in the eighties, since this strategy has the aim of reducing imports to the minimum possible and realizing an ambitious Ministry of Agriculture plan basically relying on self-sufficiency in all the main forms of grain in 5 to 7 years. We actually started that at the beginning of the national development plan in 1982, and, by seeking the aid of the techniques of advanced technology, have managed to use new types of high-productivity seeds. As far as wheat goes, per-feddan productivity has been raised to 17 ardebbs per feddan in some major harvest

areas. Although the results are not noticeable yet, it is expected that after we have propagated and distributed the new strains of seeds among farmers and guided them in the methods governing their cultivation, the Egyptian farmers' wheat output will rise to 12 ardebbs per feddan in the current season, which means an annual crop increase ranging from 3 to 4 million ardebbs.

"With respect to rice, the main export crop, the ministry has been able to overcome production obstacles, convey the most recent results of applied research to farmers and introduce new strains of the crop, such as the rijo strain, which is being planted on a broad scale this year now that all the seeds necessary to farm the area targeted for it have been provided. Experiments have proved that the average per-feddan production of this new strain of rice has increased from 2.3 to about 4 tons.

"With respect to Syrian corn, the self-sufficiency plan aims at doubling production. High-yield local strains have in fact been developed which exceed the imported strains and as a result of the use of these strains per-feddan corn productivity has increased from 10 to 24 ardebbs. The ministry this year has the amount of seeds needed to farm half a million feddans with corn.

"From this basic focal point in the plan, we find that we can realize self-sufficiency in major crops such as rice and corn in the current years of the plan. Wheat will need 2 more years. However, considering that the rice crop, which is now considered an export crop, in view of its world prices -- we find that the price of a ton of rice equals about the price of 3 tons of wheat.

"Therefore we find that exporting rice which is surplus to local consumption will give us self-sufficiency in the wheat needed to meet consumption requirements, and with the guidance of consumption in wheat we will be able to save much of the quantity of wheat imported. In the same platform, the ministry is advancing in its plan to raise the productivity of remaining crops. Lentils are now being planted in the governorates of Lower Egypt, whereas its cultivation had been restricted to Upper Egypt alone, and its productivity has risen to about 6 ardebbs per feddan. In addition, we have managed to double the production of fine corn to 22 ardebbs per feddan, as with sugar cane, then introduce new strains which have raised per-feddan productivity from 31 to 35.5 tons. In addition, there are strains which are being cultivated in the framework of applied research which will give promise of much higher production than that and will cover local sugar requirements with an expansion in sugar-beet farming in the governorates of Lower Egypt."

The Shortage of Agricultural Labor: The Problem and the Solution

I said, "Let us now move over to another important subject connected to the serious phenomenon facing the agriculture sector now, which is the severe shortage in agricultural manpower due to migration. What alternatives and measures are being adopted to cope with the problem?"

The minister of agriculture and self-sufficiency in food said,

"The fact is that most sectors are now faced with a shortage in manpower, not just the sector of agriculture. The shortage of labor in Egyptian agriculture is a modern phenomenon which began in the mid-seventies. It is apparent that this problem is reflected in agricultural production, and, in view of the aggravation of the problem of the shortage of agricultural labor in past years, to the degree where it has become impossible to continue farm work unless we find a radical solution to this problem in the general context in the country, the ministry has aimed at agricultural mechanization. The agricultural mechanization plan includes the establishment of 150 mechanical service stations throughout the republic over a period of 5 years; at the end of last June, 20 of these stations had been built. The function of these stations is to make farmers familiar with the various types of equipment as well as providing and preparing a generation of technicians trained in operating and using this equipment and establishing maintenance warehouses. In addition to that, the ministry is encouraging the spread of a group of companies specializing in mechanical service, while obtaining a loan of \$200 million from the World Bank to import agricultural machinery. This will have the effect of solving a large part of the problem of labor in the agricultural sector. There also is coordination between the Ministries of Higher Education and Education to train students in agricultural machinery specializations in these stations."

The Egyptian Village, between Production and Consumption

I asked, "Your excellency the minister, may I be permitted to raise an issue or phenomenon which is of the utmost seriousness, which now pervades the Egyptian village, since that has been transformed from a center and source of production to a source of consumption, with the many negative effects that represents? How can one restore the Egyptian village to its former productive role?"

Dr Yusuf Wali replied,

"In reality, the village's shift from production to consumption arose from the philosophy of the subsidization of foodstuffs which made consumer goods available at prices below their cost of production. For example, the price of a kilogram of flour is 5 piasters, whereas the cost of producing it is more than double that amount. Consequently, the consumer in the village has shifted to the consumption of subsidized bread instead of producing wheat and supplying it to the city. The same situation is the case relative to meat, poultry, eggs and other agricultural products besides that.

"The Ministry of Agriculture and Self-Sufficiency in Food, through its awareness of the seriousness of the situation, has the goal of changing this pattern. It knows that more than 90 percent of Egypt's farmers are small farmers.

"Therefore we have oriented ourselves toward the development of these farmers, converting them to producers who have a surplus which can be directed toward the city through the small farmer productivity project. This project has the goal of conveying modern, simplified technology to the small farmer and providing him with productive services via a new system of lending which

is different from the traditional one. This is to be applied in 27 village banks in three governorates, al-Qalyubiyah, al-Sharqiyah and Asyut. Since farmers, the ministry and the American Agency for International Development have been convinced that the project has realized increased production and increased incomes for small farmers, an agreement has been signed to extend the period of the project for another 2 years with additional financing of \$25 million. The results of this project have been apparent in regard to egg production and the production of tomatoes of modern strains, whose productivity has risen to an average output of more than 35 tons, as compared with about 7 tons in past years. The poultry battery has realized net annual income of 1,000 pounds. This year the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank will carry out a similar version of the project with 100 percent Egyptian financing in five other governorates."

The Phenomenon of the Stripping of Farmland

I said, "It is natural, since one is now conversing with the top person in charge of agriculture in Egypt, that the issue of the stripping of farmland should have a prominent place in this conversation, now that the phenomenon has become aggravated and represents a serious threat to agricultural resources. We are interested in learning about the measures which are being taken to cope with this phenomenon."

The minister of agriculture and self-sufficiency in food said, "I am anxious to stress, here, that preserving the agricultural area and maintaining its productive ability and power is a matter which has a large degree of importance as far as Egyptian society goes. It is a question of life or death, and a trust which the present generation bears toward the coming generations. The phenomenon of the stripping of the soil is an extremely grave one, one which subjects the fate of the farmland to destruction. It is sad that the situation has not stopped with the stripping off of land, but that the activity of exploitation has extended to committing aggression against the land and denuding it for the purpose of personal use by building on it. When the farmland was the basis and artery of agriculture in Egypt and our number one national responsibility, it became necessary that the ministry address itself with all its power to this serious phenomenon, taking into consideration the total discontinuation of stripping and at the same time looking for alternatives, since stripped off soil is the source of the red brick industry.

"Therefore Law 116 for 1983 was issued amending some provisions of Agriculture Law 53 for 1966 by adding a third chapter titled "Non-Infringement of the Agricultural Area and Preservation of Its Fertility." This law makes it illegal to strip farmland and remove soil from it, traffic in it, or use it except for purposes of agriculture, seizes the means of transport, machinery, equipment and soil produced from the stripping by administrative means, and punishes the people violating the provisions of these articles by imprisonment and fines which come to 50,000 pounds per feddan or part of a feddan stripped. We have also issued numerous decrees regulating the process of improving the land and preserving its fertility and the conditions for granting permits for building on it, and these decrees require that construction be permitted on farmland only in the case when the project is connected to

the site, above and beyond the approval which the governors delegate regarding areas of competence assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture governing the avoidance of aggression against farmland through the erection of buildings or stripping of land. With the powers of the new law, cooperation between the Ministry of Agriculture and the other ministries concerned for the sake of combatting this phenomenon has become constructive and fruitful. There are intensified campaigns on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Interior, and these campaigns, in the past 6 months, have produced citations and seizures concerning more than 3,500 violations of the stripping of farmland. These were all submitted to the judiciary to render decisions on them."

Agrarian Reform after 32 Years

I said, "On 9 September 1952, the first agrarian reform law was issued in Egypt. On 9 September 1984, the 32nd anniversary of this great event is being celebrated. What has been achieved in the course of these years?"

Dr Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture and self-sufficiency in food, said,

"In fact, the issuance of the agrarian reform law on 9 September 1952 was a great and tremendous event in the history of Egypt; the redistribution of agricultural ownership in Egypt, after the land had become concentrated in the hands of a few large landowners, until this small number came to own everything and the overwhelming majority of the people of Egypt did not even own their daily sustenance, was one of the most important goals of the 23 July revolution.

"The total land taken over in application of the agrarian reform laws issued in 1952, 1961, 1963 and 1969 came to 637,777 feddans in area, on top of the land that accrued to the Agrarian Reform [Department] from other sources, with the result that the total area came to 912,368 feddans, of which the total area exploited comes to 846,117 feddans, which were distributed by deeding and rental to small peasants.

"The agrarian reform policy concentrated on justice in distribution and increased production on grounds that individual ownership is not just restricted to the distribution of land that was taken over but also extended to increasing its yield and raising the productive capacity of the land. The agrarian reform mission did not end up as a traditional activity related to the takeover and redistribution of land; rather, it is a great social and economic goal whose basic objective is to raise the level of the overwhelming majority of new landowners and to seek to raise their status socially, culturally and in terms of development.

"Agrarian reform, through its cooperatives, has created long-term radical social, political and economic changes in the Egyptian countryside, especially, and in the society as a whole in general, and the agrarian reform cooperatives have played a big role in serving and looking after the children of new landowners, increasing production and income, and providing them with a life of dignity, as well as creating agricultural marketing in the

countryside, and they have offered their members a number of services in various areas.

"One result of this has been that productivity in the agrarian reform lands developed perceptibly in the last 10 years, especially. The average production of the wheat crop in 1980 came to 9,849 ardebbs per feddan and that rose to 10,614 ardebbs in 1982, then 11,054 ardebbs in 1983. Cotton production also rose from 6,735 qantars in 1980 to 7,449 qantars per feddan in 1983. The same was the case with respect to the other crops.

"After the ownership base expanded among the agrarian reform peasants, it was necessary to find ways to market their crops free from middlemen and usurers. The system of cooperative marketing was established and, through this system, it was possible to organize production activities in accordance with the actual requirements of the local and foreign market while guaranteeing that productive peasants obtained the yield of their labor and effort."

In conclusion, we can only record the utmost thanks and gratitude to Dr Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture and self-sufficiency in food, for his rapid response and the allocation of a large portion of his time to this important conversation. We believe that he has clarified many of the issues which he raised on this occasion, in spite of his enormous burdens and responsibilities.

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LEBANON

SSNP CHAIRMAN DISCUSSES PARTY'S DEVELOPMENT, POLICIES, GOODS

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 381, 20-26 Aug 84 pp 28-32

[Interview With 'Isam al-Mahayiri, chairman of the SSNP [Syrian Social Nationalist Party], by Shawqi Riyashi and Wadi' al-Hilu: "'Isam al-Mahayiri, SSNP Chairman: We Do Not Call for Single Syrian State But for Unity of Syrian Life," date and place not specified]

[Text] There have been 10 years of civil war, internal troubles and the "game of nations." Where does the leadership of the SSNP [Syrian Social Nationalist Party] stand vis-a-vis what has happened and what is happening?

Lawyer 'Isam al-Mahayiri, the party's new chairman, is familiar with the issue of the hour and with the developments cropping up in the Lebanese arena and he has a futuristic vision of the new Lebanon.

It is his opinion that the fundamental solution to the problem lies in turning to new ethics and basic social values and in building a new system founded on these ethics and principles.

In his interview with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, al Mahayiri says that his party has comprehended the Lebanese issue within the framework of the nationalist issue and that the party is a model of a united Lebanon. The questions were specific and frank and the answers, comprehensive as they were, were likewise.

Here is the interview:

[Question] If the SSNP is one of the first parties to project secular solutions to the country's various social and existential problems, so how do you explain the presence--the mere presence--of this party among the sectarian parties and how do you evaluate this party's role?

[Answer] Originally, the party proposed solving the Lebanese problem within the framework of the pan-Arab issue, taking into consideration the particular Lebanese character, which is a character emanating from the social conditions of the religious systems that have created an atmosphere of fear and established a climate that has helped foreign intervention.

The nationalist solution proposed by the party to deal with the social problem calls for establishing a system in which the state is separated from the church and which gives all citizens equal rights and duties. This system provides the means of establishing Lebanese life on the base of Lebanese citizenship, with this done within the framework of the nationalist issue. What I mean is that a Lebanon in which the will of its citizens is united under the canopy of the state is a part of a socio-economic life that pulls this state toward the other parts of the single Syrian homeland.

The SSNP has also absorbed the Lebanese issue within the framework of the nationalist issue. It is on this basis that the party has struggled in Lebanon to solve the social problem within the framework of Lebanon's bond with its environment so as to insure the Lebanese people's progress and economic growth and to insure that Lebanon undertakes its pioneer role in its environment in its capacity as an advanced cultural base and a sphere of free thought and in its capacity--within the framework of a new system founded on a single citizenship--as a lighthouse for developing its political and social conditions in its entire environment.

If Lebanon has suffered and continues to suffer from violent sectarian and religious conflicts and splits, we are confident that this suffering is the result of Lebanon's deviation from the two axes: the axis of a unified social system for its citizens' lives within a secular framework that separates state from church and prevents infiltration of all the civil institutions in the legislative, educational and military fields by religious institutions and by clergymen, and the axis of the link between the cycle of the Lebanese' economic, social, cultural and political lives and the single cycle of life combining Lebanon with the other parts of the Syrian homeland.

If these sectarian conflicts are pushing nowadays in the direction of solutions that take sectarian fanaticism into consideration, the SSNP offers with its structure, its system and the principles of its dealing with all the problems detonated by this ongoing war in Lebanon--the SSNP offers a model for a united Lebanon. Moreover, the party is eager in its political struggle that the solution--any solution taking into account sectarian considerations and the sectarian spirit--provide the opportunities for the growth of a new Lebanon, a Lebanon united within a democratic framework capable of enlightening the Lebanese as to the sound and firm solution to the Lebanese problem.

Consequently, the party is working ceaselessly with a number of secular parties with different ideological tendencies to form a national democratic front that contributes to the democratic struggle by bringing about the sound development of Lebanese political life in the direction of a state based on equality, justice and a single Lebanese citizenship.

Fifty Years

[Question] Fifty years have passed since the party was founded. During this period, it has gone through various political experiences. What is your evaluation of the struggle throughout this period?

[Answer] My opinion is that the nationalist call is founded on principles that are in total conflict with the psychological, political and cultural principles of the legacy of the old and backward system prevalent in all entities of the Syrian homeland. This call cannot help being faced with violent hostilities and conflicts, whether under the canopy of the foreign colonialist who resorted to establishing his control over the legacy of life and establishing backward political and social conditions or at the level of the influential political forces which derive their influence from this legacy and from its impact on the people's lives and conditions.

If we add to all this the fact that the SSNP arose on the base of a genuine and profound understanding of the devastating danger represented by the Zionist plan to our national existence in the homeland's various entities and on the base of a strong determination to confront this Zionist plan--if we add all this up, we can realize how broad and strong was the enemies' front and how hard and difficult our struggle has been. Our progress throughout more than half a century has abounded with numerous setbacks and defeats, some of which we may be responsible for. But it is indubitable that our undertaking this big responsibility in all its cultural, psychological, social and political dimensions can be considered the source of all the bitter experiences that have accompanied our struggle.

Despite this, we are ultimately a movement that has triumphed over the elements of the pressure and frustration that have pursued it. It is a movement that has triumphed within itself as the model of a true revival embodied in the movement's emergence from all its tribulations with a stronger cohesion and with a stronger impact on its environment. This movement now holds a prominent place among the national liberation and nationalist forces. Through its democratic struggle, the movement is offering its environment a pioneer experiment whose concepts are having their indisputable impact on developing the level of the awareness of our people and of their political forces.

[Question] One of the party's fundamental principles is its call for the unity of natural Syria, whereas we find the party focusing nowadays on Lebanon's unity. Has there been a voluntary lowering, if we may use the phrase, of the party's aspirations?

[Answer] The truth is that I defined the party's struggle in the Lebanese arena in my previous answer. It is a struggle based on two axes: the axis of establishing Lebanon's social life on the basis of legal, political and economic equality within the framework of a single citizenship which insures Lebanon's unity, and an axis that reaffirms the bond of the Lebanese entity with its environment by virtue of the single life cycle in the Syrian homeland so that the unity of Syrian life may be guaranteed on the political as well as the economic and social levels.

The SSNP does not call for Syrian unity in its political sense, i.e., establishing a single Syrian state, but calls for the unity of Syrian life on whose basis political unity becomes permissible and thinkable. This is why the party has always and since the time of its formation been asserting that what it seeks is to build bases to unify the principles of life and not to set up an absolute political unity and that political unity comes as a consequence and not as a cause, especially in the face of the particular Lebanese characteristic which requires that we devote in our unionist eagerness attention to establishing in Lebanon the principles that guarantee the unity of Lebanon and guarantee a system where there are no first-class citizens and second-class citizens, where there are no people who feel fear and where there is no feeling of fear and so forth. All these characteristics are due ultimately to clinging to the sectarian rules in building the state and the failure to separate state affairs from religious issues.

If the party is struggling nowadays to entrench Lebanon's unity, this struggle is not totally divorced from the party's struggle to reaffirm the need to preserve Lebanon's bond with its environment out of concern for the unity of Lebanese life itself. This is because swerving from the nationalist axis to the axes of entities which, by the very nature of the entity axis itself, split into sectarian axes as a result of this tribulation from which Lebanon is suffering. This means that swerving from the nationalist axis has led to the dispersion of loyalties to the sectarian axes. Therefore, the struggle to preserve Lebanon's unity is tied to the struggle to preserve Lebanon's cohesion with its environment in all spheres, i.e., it is tied to preserving the social, economic, security and political unity that pulls Lebanon toward all the entities of the Syrian homeland, especially toward the Syrian Arab Republic. It is a Lebanese struggle and a nationalist struggle simultaneously.

Lesson

[Question] After being preoccupied with Lebanese affairs for a long time, the party has elected you president for the next 4 years.

[Answer] You know that since its formation, the SSNP has been a single central party encompassing the Syrian [Nationalists] in various entities, including Lebanon, Syria and others. This is not the first time I have assumed the party chairmanship nor the first time in which members from outside the Lebanese entity have been elected to the party chairmanship. Secretary Mustafa Rashid, a Palestinian citizen who was a member of the Jordanian House of Representatives in 1956, was elected party chairman at a time when the party headquarters was in Lebanon. When the party headquarters was in Damascus, the party chairman was a Lebanese. This means that this party elects its officials without submitting to any national consideration. I personally have been in the party leadership in Lebanon since 1970, either as chairman of the Supreme Council or as a member of the council.

The important thing is not in the national identity of the partisan official but in the nationalist strategy and in the phases of the practical application

of this strategy. Within this framework, the party's eagerness for its role in the Lebanese entity and the party's comprehension of what this entity represents and what preserving this entity and struggling to make it a base for a nationalist revival and advancement in its entire environment represent--the party's desire for this strategic truth does not change if the party is headed by a chairman with a Lebanese identity, a Jordanian identity, a Syrian identity....

I would like to clarify here the issue of jurisdiction. Throughout its history, the party has gone through numerous constitutional experiments. All the constitutional organizational modifications introduced into the party's structure have emanated from practical experiences which reveal the need to deal with organizational structural gaps to help enhance the level of organizational action.

Within this framework, the latest SSNP congress noticed two particular gaps: a gap pertaining to the party's decision making and a gap pertaining to the base from which the party's higher institutions emanate. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, the congress underlined the need to fortify the executive apparatus by requiring that the formation of the Council of Deans [majlis al-'umud] take place on a decision by the Supreme Council. Insofar as the decision making is concerned, the congress noted that the executive political decisions concerning the general executive policy and concerning coordination among the party's various departments, which is the concern of the Council of Deans, should be collective decisions and not decisions made by the party chairman on his own after consultations with and in the Council of Deans in particular, which was the case before the recent modifications.

As for the base from which the Supreme Council and, consequently, the other party agencies emanate, the congress has noted that confining this base to the secretaries constitutes a gap in the party's democratic structure. Thus, the congress recommended implementation of Constitutional Directive No 4 concerning the election of the provincial councils and executive councils and that the representatives of the executive councils take part with the secretaries as a base electing the Supreme Council. All these modifications have been dictated by practical experience and by the need to develop these institutions in a sounder and more democratic direction.

As for my election, it is natural that it emanates from these organizational constitutional rules. The rules did not emanate from my election.

Al-Kurah Battle Surprised All

[Question] Can it be said that there is a collective leadership of the party, along with the preservation of the party chairmanship?

[Answer] The fact is that the concept of collective leadership is not a uniform concept. There are those who imagine that a collective leadership means a single collective authority for decision making at the various levels and there are those who believe that the adoption of decisions within

the framework of voting is an embodiment of collective leadership. The fact is also that our party has always made a distinction between political decisions and executive decisions. Political decisions have always been entrusted to a council, i.e., to discussions and voting taking place in the Supreme Council for higher strategic decisions and to discussions only in the Council of Deans on issues concerning the general executive policy.

The latest modification has been careful to keep the political decision within the Supreme Council and to tie the decision concerning the general executive policy to the Council of Deans, but with consultation and voting, whereas consultation was previously the basis for issuing the decisions concerning the executive policy and whereas the party chairman used to make the decisions, they continue to be issued by the official in his capacity as the head of an agency and not by the agency.

[Question] How do you evaluate the recent battles that took place in al-Kurah between the party's forces and al-Muradah Forces?

[Answer] For problems to develop between allied or friendly political forces or for such problems to lead to armed clashes is something that has accompanied the tribulation that has been upending Lebanon since its creation. But the battle witnessed by al-Kurah between us and al-Muradah was surprising to all because it went beyond a local clash which erupts as a result of a problem to a general and unjustifiable battle between two sides who have had the relations of an alliance that has spanned long years--relations characterized by friendliness and respect and by successive visits and contacts between the leaderships.

In this battle, the SSNP was in the position of self-defense and of defending its deep-rooted partisan presence in an area always known as an area where the party has had a broad political and popular role and a position in defending this area's right to exercise its political freedom, its secular nationalist quality that is open to the whole environment, be it Tripoli, Zgharta, Bsharri or al-Batrun, and its right to embody the image of a single Lebanon with its numerous sects and its numerous political currents.

This regrettable battle is something which the SSNP is eager to surpass through its adherence to the dictates of its alliance with ex-President Franjiah and through its eagerness to bolster the points of agreement and to respect the national role of ex-President Franjiah at the level of all of Lebanon.

[Question] The party has been accused of participating in or carrying out the operation in which Bashir al-Jumayyil was assassinated. Can you define the party's role in this operation?

[Answer] The party chairman declared at the time in an official communique that the party had no connection whatsoever with the assassination of Bashir al-Jumayyil. When some reports mentioned the name of Secretary Nabil al-'Alam, a member of the Supreme Council, this council interrogated

member and secretary Nabil al-'Alam and it became evident to the council that what was attributed to Secretary al-'Alam was no more than rumor, which al-'Alam denied decisively. Consequently, the Supreme Council decided to consider what was contained in Secretary Nabil al-'Alam's testimony enough to view all disseminated rumors as untrue and groundless.

As a party, we were pleased when our party delegation, comprised of Secretary Mustafa 'Izz-al-Din, the Supreme Council chairman, and Secretary 'Abdallah al-Qubrusi, the council member, met with Pierre al-Jumayyil in his office at al-Sayfi. It was obvious to Pierre al-Jumayyil that our party had no connection with the assassination. Al-Jumayyil told our delegation verbatim: "Such things are done by some rash people without the party having any connection with them. I am aware of this fact and I know that your party has been an honorable party throughout this war."

Thus, when we underline that the party had no connection with the issue, we make our assertion on the basis of the fact that the issue [assassination] shocked all of the party's institutions and agencies. Our investigation of the issue proved decisively that Secretary Nabil al-'Alam had nothing to do with this assassination.

[Question] The party has undergone various ideological phases. At the outset, the party gave priority to the Syrian nationalist issue over other Lebanese issues. In a later phase, it gave priority to the Lebanese issue over other issues. It then gave priority to the economic issue over the Syrian nationalist issue. The question is: does your election constitute a return to the starting point, i.e., to giving priority to the Syrian nationalist issue over the above-mentioned issues?

[Answer] The phases you are speaking of are phases dictated by the development of the area's political conditions, with each phase of the struggle dominated by a certain quality characterizing our party struggle. This is because our party has its nationalist dimension, its social dimension and its Arab dimension. The party has underlined the inseparability of these dimensions since the time it was founded. But the nature of the conflict at one stage or another allowed one of these three aspects to prevail and become the main concern.

In this phase, it has become evident that the struggle is against the Israeli enemy, now that this enemy has succeeded in infiltrating popular Lebanese forces and that it has been able to establish in Lebanon some sort of an equation through some forces that do not hesitate to involve an Israeli role in Lebanese life--in this phase, it has become evident that preserving Lebanon's unity, liberating its soil and reaffirming its Arabism are issues that require stronger and more effective popular enlightenment as to the nationalist reality that binds Lebanon to its Syrian environment and to the reality of the link between Lebanon's interest and Lebanon's assumption of its position in the nationalist struggle against the Zionist scheme and its plan, which seeks primarily to destroy Lebanon and to obstruct its role in the area and, consequently, to usurp this role and exploit it for its benefits. This means that the SSNP will perform in this phase its nationalist

role more strongly and firmly, without neglecting the socialist aspect of the nationalist issue. This is because Lebanon's success in performing its nationalist role is tied to the people's cohesion and to achieving social, legal and economic justice and to putting an end to the system of exploitation and of social and class disparity.

Lebanon's nationalist role is essentially an Arab role simultaneously because our nationalist reality is an Arab reality and because our single Syrian environment is the basis for a comprehensive Arab revival and a fundamental instrument for achieving the unity of all Arabs.

As for the party chairman, he implements the party plan formulated by the Supreme Council. It is normal that our plan always comes in response to the dictates and nature of the phase.

Positive Signs of Solution

[Question] What is your opinion of the statement that the party, in its present condition, has added another sect to the existing sects instead of being an alternative to them?

[Answer] If sectarianism is an affiliation through which one ties himself to the sect--the group--then there is no doubt that the SSNP constitutes an affiliation under which each of us binds himself to the group, i.e., the nation. Outwardly, this can be considered an affiliation added to the other affiliations. Consequently, those with a superficial view may consider the party a new sect. But in the essence and content of this affiliation--the affiliation concerning the Syrian nationalist's bond to his nation, i.e., to this entire group with its sectarian groupings, and to his considering himself responsible for liberating all these groupings from partial loyalties and for tying them to the loyalty of a single citizenship--the SSNP is not a sect added to the other existing sects but is rather the new nation that has embodied the people's will and that has offered a model of the truth of the people's unity and of the impregnability of this single popular truth that does not crack and break apart under the pressure of sectarian fanaticism, regardless of how violently this fanaticism storms our heads, the hearts and institution. This proves that our people are united and that those who are fanning the fires of sectarianism and its rancor cannot reflect the people's interest in their unity or the interest of the group--or sect--of which they proclaim themselves leaders.

[Question] How do you evaluate the situation currently prevalent in Lebanon? Are we at the doors of a solution or are we going through a warrior's respite? In other words, is the projected security plan capable of helping to establish the mainstays of the desired internal solution for the Lebanese crisis?

[Answer] There are positive signs that encourage us to be optimistic, despite all the points of disagreement and conflict that surface. Acknowledgement by all the parties involved that the solution to Lebanon will not come by what

may be called the military solution--which has been tried and suffered one failure after another--this acknowledgment that the concord of the Lebanese depends on their agreement on the common factors uniting them is in itself a starting point toward a course different from all the courses we have tried so far. In this sense, we assess the Geneva and Lausanne conferences positively.

The common denominators are that the Lebanese people are a unit of economic, social and political life and that the religious and sectarian differences should not and cannot strike the unity of life with all its security, economic, cultural and legal requirements.

For the discussion to turn to reconciling the requirements of the unity of life with the multiplicity of religions and sects and with the division of the Lebanese into sectarian groups is one thing and for the discussion to proceed from the viewpoint that the sectarian multiplicity is a multiplicity of the units of life and not a single unit of life is something totally different.

What calls for optimism is the sound awareness that the unity of Lebanese life and the need to proceed from the requirements of this unity in dealing with sectarian and religious multiplicity is a path that can only lead to concord through agreement.

The other sign for optimism is that all the parties concerned have come to acknowledge that Lebanese life must be founded on the basis of typing Lebanon's progress, security and unity with the need for understanding and coordination with the Syrian Arab Republic, proceeding on the basis of the facts of life that bind the twin countries and reaffirming the Arabism of Lebanon, for which the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes the main gate. The acknowledgment of this nationalist fact and of its requirements means that a Lebanon that has found itself and that is proceeding along the sound axis of its life is a Lebanon capable of putting an end to all the tribulations it has been suffering and of liberating Lebanese life from the confrontational partial axes along which it has been led by the unnationalist view, or views, that have stormed it.

What the country needs transforms our optimism into a reality that carries us from the so-called truce situation to a situation in which a healthy, sovereign and truly united Lebanon can be established within the framework of its constitutional institutions and its popular life. What Lebanon needs is for some of its forces to be liberated once and for all from the trap of following the Israeli role and of continuing to become a big factor in Israeli equation.

The government and all the Lebanese parties concerned are called upon to make a clear and final decision on this particular point so that we may be able to transform our optimism from the framework of welcoming what has been done to establish the security of the one legitimate government in all of Lebanon and to overcome sectarian and provincial boundaries to the framework of

asserting that Lebanon has been provided with a firm and proper base on which to establish a Lebanese system capable of putting an end to whatever is shattering the lives of the Lebanese and capable of moving the lives of the Lebanese in the direction of unity, progress and dignity.

[Question] Throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict, since the 1967 war and until the present specifically, Israel has been determining the Arab strategy. Since 1967, the Arabs have developed a common plan and a common Arab strategy embodied in demanding Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories as a prelude to any solution, i.e., they have transformed the Arab-Israeli conflict from a struggle for survival to a conflict over borders.

Moreover, the consequences of the Israeli invasion could not be confronted except through forming a sectarian alliance against a sect made dominant by the invasion. This means that any solution will be cooked on the Israeli fire. In other words, if the war of sects is prolonged, it can only lead to fragmentation. For sectarian concord to be achieved, concessions have to be made and, ultimately, concessions have to be made in the interest of Israel. This time also Israel has diverted the struggle from its true essence. Instead of being a cultural struggle, it has turned into a deadly struggle within the single society. How do you evaluate the issue and where do you place the party vis-a-vis all this, considering that yours is the party that describes itself as the plan opposed to Zionist objectives?

[Answer] There is no doubt that our reactions to events are the result of the Israeli action and are within the framework of the current balance of forces. The same applies to our position toward the 1967 war, with the demand for withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 being turned into the objective of our "pan-Arab" struggle. As a result of the Israeli invasion and the capitulation accord emanating from it, our reaction has come to be embodied in pulling the sects toward each other after foiling the attempt of a certain sect to dominate the other sects so that it may become possible through this sectarian pulling together to liberate the south and to put an end to what may be called the Israeli equation in Lebanon.

It is obvious that we are still in the phase of reaction and that our reaction is governed by the existing balance of forces. The SSNP realizes that our moving from the phase of reaction to the phase of action requires that we possess a background of strength and of cultural, psychological, scientific and military development. The party is also aware that creating the background for our development comes through a political, social, economic, cultural and ethical structure that puts an end to the "mosaic" of structures that can produce nothing other than weakness and inability. In other words, our social nationalist struggle is for the purpose of changing what is within ourselves, i.e., for putting an end to the state of fragmentation prevalent in our Syrian environment and to the state of backwardness, exploitation and oppression prevalent in the Arab world. Putting an end to all this or moving in the direction of formulas that overcome all these conditions or that pull us toward the path to overcome them is what enables us to move from the state of reaction to the state of action and, consequently, to making the strategy determined by our interests, reality and rights the

strategy that maps for us the horizons of our struggle and of its phased objectives.

The Syrian Arab Republic, which is nowadays a political base for the nationalist struggle, is moving ahead with full responsibility with its steps in the general nationalist struggle. We should overcome narrow partisan considerations out of loyalty to the strategy of change which our nation needs in order that it may become the influential force in the area and not the force influenced by the strategies mapped out and determined for us by the enemy's plans and his superior military capabilities. In this regard, we are optimistic that the phase of reaction will not last long and that our nation's ability to take charge of its affairs and to determine current events with its will is growing and is based upon the belief that the fateful battle can only end with our definite victory.

Outside Lebanon

[Question] The party has not known in the Syrian nation's other entities as much political activity as it has known in Lebanon. Is the party leadership inclined to go beyond Lebanon to the other entities?

[Answer] We are a party with a cause. What is of concern is the triumph of our cause. It is our wager that our party is the instrument of victory. When we say that our party is the instrument of victory, what we mean is that the party must adapt to existing conditions in order that it may be able to be an instrument of nationalist victory and so that it may not turn rigid because the meaning of the instrument and of the supreme objectives of the nationalist instrument is lost.

We play our role as an instrument in every entity. But we do so in various ways because we are aware that we may or may not need offices for our role, which is a role of stimulation and mobilization for a political and popular struggle with clear objectives, depending on the circumstances. We are engaged at present in a nationalist struggle with certain methods and in certain ways in the Lebanese arena. We are also engaged in struggle in the other entities through our definition of the role of each regime within the context of the fateful nationalist battle and of its requirements. In the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, we feel that we are influential in the distinguished nationalist struggle role undertaken by the Syrian Arab Republic and its partisan regime and in its political and mobilizational struggle inside and outside the republic in order to map out a steadfastness and confrontation strategy vis-a-vis the Israeli enemy and the U.S. imperialist plan.

[Question] How do you understand the issue of the minorities and what are the solutions you project for this social problem?

[Answer] The problem of the minorities or the so-called minorities in our area is coupled with a certain notion of Islam which is embraced by the majority in our countries, namely the notion that Islam is church and state

and that the religious state concurrent with the nature of Islam is a state, according to this notion, that creates the status second-class citizenship for the other non-Islamic sects.

I am certain that the notion that Islam and the religious state are concurrent is a wrong notion. There isn't in the entire Islamic world a single state founded on the rules and dictates of the Islamic Shari'a in the various constitutional, legal, penal, economic and financial spheres. Some of these states adopt one aspect of the religious dictates and others adopt another aspect. Some of them are satisfied with the appearance, without any substance. You see this in most of the Arab countries that eagerly declare their Islam. This means that all these countries are far from the quality of the Islamic religious state as known to the initial era of Islam and to the following eras. If we add to this the fact that many prominent Islamic thinkers, some of whom are clergymen and theologians, have proven through purely Islamic studies that the religious state is not concurrent with Islam, as some say, and that the Muslims' general acceptance of the systems of the state in which they live and where they constitute the majority means that the Islamic religious state with its stipulated features is not something dictated by religious faith. We realize that the battle to separate Islam as religion from the religious state may be a long battle. But the road to the battle is open and this battle requires the struggle of all the forces which believe in a state with a legal system where the principles of legal and social justice are established without discriminating between one citizen and another in rights and duties or in any form of human activity.

The solution to the minorities' problem lies in solving the problem of the so-called religious state. This solution does not lie in establishing the religious state or in withdrawing to religious cantons. The solution comes with the struggle of all citizens from all sects and religions to assert that the affairs of state are different from the affairs of religion. The solution also lies in the concerted effort of the enlightened elements from all sects and religions to confront the faulty principle of the concurrence of Islam and the religious state and to underline this fault through enlightenment, clarification and mobilization so that sound religious awareness may triumph as a sound national and nationalist awareness triumphs.

[Question] What is the political title you give to the coming phase?

[Answer] Through my great optimism--an optimism resulting from the great capacity for struggle displayed by our people to support their supreme goals and from this magnificent armed struggle that is being waged daily, rather every hour, by the Lebanese national resistance in successive and unrelenting operations against the Zionist enemy--through the awakening of the national forces and parties to the importance of their cohesion and through the Syrian Arab Republic's performance of its nationalist role throughout the entire homeland, despite all the forms of pressure and danger this republic is facing, I can say that this is the phase of opening the path. It is a phase for which the sincerest determination is present. It is this determination that has enabled Lebanon to surpass two fundamental

junctures in the progress of its revival, namely the juncture of the need for concord and for abandoning the illusions of military domination and two juncture of coordination and cooperation with Damascus. Opening the path is a difficult process, but it has become clear now. Considering that our party declared since its formation that it opened the path by being formed, then it is certain that our nation's opening of its path has now begun with instruments that go beyond our party's capabilities to include the major capabilities in our nation.

8494

CSO: 4404/637

LEBANON

RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL LEADERS COMPLICATE DANGEROUS SITUATION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1451, 24 Aug 84 pp 4-5

[Article: "Lebanon's Tribulation, Among Turbans, Cowls and Fezes; Differences of Politicians and Clergymen Are Settled by Riyadh, Damascus and the Vatican"]

[Text] In 1958, a civil war similar to the war under which the Lebanese have been living for the last 10 years broke out. That was also a war which started as a political war over who was to run Lebanon's policy and over whether it was to be Lebanese President Camille Sham'un or Egyptian President 'Abd-al-Nasir. But it ended as a sectarian war in which the Muslims lined up on one side and the Christians on the other.

In that war, former Lebanese President Camille Sham'un was annoyed with a Christian clergyman who did not agree with all of Sham'un's political tendencies. The ex-president asked this clergyman: when will the time come when the clergymen stop engaging in political affairs? The clergyman, a patriarch, answered: when politicians stop engaging in religious affairs!

What is happening in Lebanon is that in addition to the civil war, there is both a secret and an open war between political leaders who engage in the sectarian trade and clergymen who aspire to the political trade. They are competing for everything, in all spheres and with all means. In rallies, in the press, in salons and on television, turbaned men [Muslim clergymen], men with cowls, men with fezes and civilians with uncovered heads take turns in expressing their opinions on the issues and in attacking each other, with the ordinary Lebanese citizen getting perplexed as to whom to turn for direction: to the political leader or to the clergyman? In this respect, chaos is rampant.

In Christian circles, the political leaders have been able gradually to overcome the clergymen's intervention in politics. At the outset of the war, the name of Abbot Sharbil Qassis, the head of the Lebanese orders, shone and almost topped the list of the names of both military and political leaders. But the late Bashir al-Juma-yil got hurt by the abbot's role and status and so intervened for the election of a new head for these orders. Abbot Qassis was succeeded by Abbot Bulus Nu'man, who filled the arena for

a while. But Amin al-Jumayyil, the current president, has done with Nu'man what his brother had done with Qassis. The Lebanese president has employed the help of the pope in Rome, who has a decisive power over the Maronite Church which was once independent of the papacy in numerous affairs. But with time, the Maronite Church has turned into an ordinary Catholic church under the direct control of Rome.

The issue on which Amin al-Jumayyil disagreed with Bulus Nu'man was the issue of the latter's position vis-a-vis the relationship with Israel, which the abbot visited and concerning which he made numerous positive statements. The Lebanese president, who did not wish to put all his eggs in Israel's basket, was annoyed. The president did not sign the accord concluded with Israel. He did not perhaps believe in this accord to start with and only used it as a maneuver to exert pressure on the Arab countries, especially on President al-Asad, to reach an agreement with him.

This is why Amin al-Jumayyil complained to the pope in Rome about Bulus Nu'man's involvement in political affairs. The pope has put an end to Nu'man's political activity.

In 1948 Bisharah al-Khuri, the first Lebanese president, did the same thing with Aghnatiyus Mubarak, the Maronite bishop of Beirut, who demanded peace with Israel. Pope John banished the bishop from Lebanon at the time, thus providing the affirmation that the Vatican has been since then more reserved toward Israel and more cautious of it than some of the Lebanese clergymen, and perhaps more than some Lebanese politicians also. The Vatican attaches great importance to a continued good relationship between Lebanon and the Arab countries.

Recently, the papacy has had a role in blessing the Lebanese-Syrian accord built on the debris of the Lebanese-Israeli accord. With the start of the honeymoon between the two countries, a Vatican delegation visited Syria and thanked it for its excellent reception of President Amin al-Jumayyil. The delegation prayed in the presence of al-Asad for continued understanding, consultation and coordination on all matters big and small, as is the case at present.

Observers scrutinizing the hidden secrets of the conflicts existing between the politicians and the clergymen in the Islamic circles say that even though the [political] leaders' suffering with the turbaned men has gone on longer than the Christian leaders' suffering with the men with the tiaras, the means to solve these conflicts will be similar to the solutions in the Christian arena. The Muslim leaders complain of the clergymen to King Fahd and to Damascus and want them to put an end to the political activity of the shaykhs.

King Fahd and President al-Asad have a power that emanates not only from Saudi Arabia's special religious status but also from the availability of the means of influence in the two capitals of Riyadh and Damascus.

There have been many statements to the effect that some Lebanese prime ministers, both past and present, have expressed to the gentlemen in Riyadh

and Damascus during their recent visits to the two capitals bitter complaints against a number of Muslim clergymen in the first and second capitals of Lebanon [Beirut and Tripoli].

The Lebanese body politic is a cohesive whole. If an organ of this body suffers, the other parts rush to its aid.

Shaykh Hasan Khalid, the mufti of the republic, has for a long time led the effort to unite the politicians in Beirut. He has succeeded to a large degree in bringing the estranged closer to each other and has occupied a position in the Lebanese political game. Though the mufti may have pleased the majority with his effort, it seems that he has not pleased all.

As for Tripoli's Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, the amir of the Islamic Unification Movement, he does not engage in politics in the tranquil and peaceful manner in which the mufti of the republic engages. This has exposed Sha'ban since the Palestinian events in Tripoli and continues to expose him to numerous problems, including his problem with Rashid Karami, Tripoli's leader, who is, in turn, the son of Tripoli's political leader and of its religious mufti at the same time.

It is the habit of the Arabs to interfere in Lebanon, when they do interfere, under the slogan of curtailing radicalism in some Islamic environments. This is why there is great hope among the Muslim Lebanese leaderships that the Riyadh and Damascus group will exert efforts to provide relief to the Islamic leaderships as the pope has provided relief to the secular Christian leaderships so that one faction may not rest while the other faction remains worried in body and soul.

All this pertains to the conflicts within the Sunna sect. As for the conflicts between the politicians and the clergymen in the Shi'ite sect, they are severer and more dangerous. Neither Shaykh Muhammad Shams-al-Din, the deputy of the missing Imam Musa al-Sadr, nor Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah has a light impact on the hearts of the Shi'ite politicians. The two are totally free to express their opinions which, most often, are different from the opinions of the clergymen who are present or former ministers.

The Shi'ite political leadership's annoyance with the clergymen is old and deep. It is deeper than that existing in the Sunna arena. Under the French Mandate, the Shi'ite leaders trembled in fear in the face of the position of the Grand Jurisprudent [mujtahid] Muhsin al-Amin, who carried an unbending stick in the face of the foreign ruler whereas the collaborating politicians carried canes that bent with every gust of wind.

The disagreement between leader Kamil al-As'ad and Musa al-Sadr is the best-known political-religious disagreement in Lebanon. Al-As'ad has maintained the same position for years and al-Sadr has disappeared. But the disagreement has not disappeared, despite the firm position taken by al-As'ad toward al-Sadr's disappearance.

Regarding the issue of Shi'ite representation in the current cabinet, none of the Shi'ite clergymen objected to Nabih Barri's assumption of the ministerial portfolio. But what is in the heart is not the same as what is on the written line.

Even though Damascus is capable of playing a major role in solving the disagreements arising in Shi'ite circles, Tehran is not close enough geographically to Beirut so that its help may be sought whenever an emergency rises, and there are problems for which the only successful cure is the Iranian cure.

The Lebanese jungle has been and continues to be filled with ghosts and it is unlikely that the Lebanese citizen will walk in this jungle in safety from these disagreements that erupt suddenly, not only between the Christians and the Muslims but also among the Islamic leaders themselves as well as among the Christian leaders.

The latest problem that the security plan has encountered in the Lebanese jungle that is relatively calm at present are these strong statements that have been made by Muhammad Abu Shaqra, the paramount shaykh of the Druze sect. The shaykh has firmly opposed the idea of returning the Christians evicted from al-Shuf without this return being coupled with a comprehensive solution for the entire problem. He has said that he is opposed to the deployment of the present army deep in the mountain and has demanded a military unit under Druze colors to be given the authority to perform the desired role.

Even though the statements of Shaykh Abu Shaqra differ in the details with the statements of Walid Junblatt, the unity of leadership in the Druze sect is fully secured and Junblatt is not faced with a problem of the type confronting both the Sunna and Shi'ite leaders.

The Arab countries are becoming more and more aware of the delicateness of the Lebanese political map, especially the sectarian political map. As for the major powers, their knowledge of this issue is old, though it is being updated with the passage of time. France is, to a degree, tantamount to the maker of the details of this map since the start of its interest in Lebanese affairs in the 18th century.

As for the United States, it constructs its policies on the basis of dealing with the leadership of the countries with which it has relations. In Lebanon, the leadership means both the politicians and the clergymen.

Recently, the Soviets have also begun to say that the sectarian parties represent the popular forces in their sects. They are as much interested in the Amal Movement now as they are in the Progressive Socialist Party. They have invited Barri to Moscow and have given him a friendly reception. At the ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of the establishment of relations between Lebanon and the Soviet Union, Dr Husayn Yatim, Amal Movement's adviser, was the main speaker on the occasion.

During the visit made to Lebanon by Vladimir (Polyakov), the head of the Middle East Section of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within the framework of his Arab tour of Syria and Jordan, the Soviet understanding of the internal and external Lebanese situation was made evident. The Soviets say that their position will take into consideration Lebanon's request to expand the deployment of the UN forces in South Lebanon and describe Lebanon's objection to separating [sic] the Israeli and Syrian forces as legitimate because this separation is tantamount to an entrenchment of the partition. They have even said that Polyakov's visit must not be given extraordinary significance and that Prime Minister Karami's visit to Moscow has not been set yet. They have also said that while welcoming the Soviet initiative demanding an international conference on the Mideast crisis, Lebanon has made it clear that it puts the demand of liberating the land at the top of its list of priorities. The Soviet statements do not reflect the picture of the international situation of the Lebanese issue. Despite the international progress in Lebanon [sic], the major political issue has not been raised in a fundamental and urgent manner. Politically, there are no clear features of an expected solution. It seems that the Lebanese issue is shelved insofar as the United States and Israel are concerned. The utmost that the Arab and Lebanese efforts can do is just to bolster the security situation while waiting for the right winds to blow for an international political solution, especially insofar as a solution to the Israeli occupation is concerned.

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CSO: 4404/637

NVOI CONDEMNS IRAN'S TIES WITH ISRAEL

TA162037 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 16 Oct 84

[Unattributed commentary: "The Islamic Regime's Ties With the Regime Occupying Qods are Condemned"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: Recently Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Islamic Majlis, sent a letter to the speakers of parliaments of 46 countries, calling on them to help the Palestinian people by supporting the appeal of 22 nonaligned countries to expel Israel from the UN organization. Apparently there is no room for criticism of this measure by Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani. The expulsion of Zionist Israel from the UN, as well as its punishment, is endorsed by the Iranian people. However, it should be stated that the measure which Mr Rafsanjani has carried out in the name of the Islamic regime is only superficial. Deep down, Iran's Islamic regime does not have the slightest faith or belief in what it stated.

Contrary to the sham quarrel it is having with Israel and the United States, in practice Iran's Islamic regime has close ties with these two countries in many respects, and is the associate, companion, and colleague of Zionist Israel and the imperialist U.S. Government. The Islamic regime's leaders are lying to the people in regard to their hostility toward Israel's Zionists and world-devouring America because all their measures in the international arena, particularly their attitude toward the Middle East problem, the Iran-Iraq war, and the problems pertaining to Afghanistan, conform to the plan and evil intentions of Israel and America.

As an example, one can only point to the Iran-Iraq war. Today, even a schoolchild knows that a war that has been going on for more than 4 years between Iran and Iraq only benefits the imperialists and Zionists. Nevertheless, the Islamic regime's leaders still refuse to end the war and conclude an honorable, just, and lasting peace agreement. The reason is that America has an interest in continuing this destructive war. Isarel is pleased at the prolongation of this war of attrition because it undermines both warring countries. Moreover, the continuation of this U.S.-desired war provides a pretext for the Islamic regime's leaders to refrain from fulfilling the revolution's goals by maintaining the demands and interests of social parasites and wealth-seekers.

We said that Zionist Israel is pleased at the prolongation of the Iran-Iraq war, and is adding fuel to it. Now, officials of the Islamic Republic themselves, after years of issuing denials and tossing insults at those who uncovered the Islamic regime's deals with Zionist Israel, are admitting that they buy arms from Israel. Israeli officials, too, have explicitly stated and continue to state that they deliver arms to Iran's Islamic regime. According to foreign newspapers, Israel places weapons and war material at the disposal of Iran's Islamic regime--which depicts itself as the foe of Zionism--through the Federal Republic of Germany. Israeli weapons are reportedly first transported to Frankfurt airport, and then are dispatched to Iran by cargo planes of the Islamic Republic of Iran. An Israeli company by the name of Motorola is offering Iran's Islamic regime spare parts for Bell helicopters; F-4, F-5, and F-14 fighter aircraft; as well as Hawk, Sparrow, [name indistinct], and Stinger missiles at a high cost. In view of the Islamic regime of Iran's good close relations with the Qods-occupying regime, informed observers correctly note that the Islamic regime, which has betrayed the Iranian revolution, has been able to maintain its fragile and false rule only with the aid of U.S., British, and Israeli weapons.

Israel and America have an interest in prolonging a futile war that is destroying Iran. By delivering weapons and military hardware to Iran's Islamic regime, they are encouraging and instigating it to prolong the war. Our homeland's people condemn the continuation of the imposed war and the warmongering policy of the Islamic rulers. Our homeland's people condemn the relations of Iran's Islamic regime with the Qods-occupying regime, which is part and parcel of the policy of rapprochement with world-devouring U.S. imperialism. The peace-loving Iranian people explicitly demand that the Iran-Iraq war be terminated, and that an end be put to any ties and relations with imperialist countries, and foremost of all with Israel's Zionist regime.

CSO: 4640/72

TEHRAN TV COMMENTS ON EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

GF131800 Tehran Television Service in Arabic 0930 GMT 13 Oct 84

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] The Zionist enemy's turn to pave the road for the Egyptian regime's return to the Arab League coincides with the intensification of Morocco's efforts to hold the Arab summit conference on Egypt's return to the Arab ranks.

It is known that Mubarak's regime is firm in its stance on the Camp David agreement and that it receives over \$2 billion from the United States in exchange for his pledges to continue marching in step with the U.S.-Zionist line. In exchange for flying the Zionist flag on Egypt's territories the Mubarak regime ensures its continued existence, with the help of U.S. intelligence networks which have pledged since al-Sadat's death to safeguard Mubarak's life as long as the latter adheres to the U.S. capitulatory line and the Camp David accords.

Egyptian arms are still directed against the Egyptian people, as occurred in Kafr al-Dawar, instead of being directed against the usurper enemy. The regime still considers its battle alongside Saddam as an alternative battle to fighting the Zionists.

The Zionists and Husni Mubarak desire Egypt's return to the Arab League and the return of the Arab regimes to Egypt because this would put Egypt in a better position to manage the game of peace and capitulation in the Arab world. Mubarak believes that a single word by Israel against Egypt is enough to break the ice in Egyptian-Arab relations and this is what recently occurred.

However, will this belief alter the facts and will the Arab Muslim masses be convinced by these cheap bargaining methods? Will they change their clear view about this regime--fully immersed in the swamp of treachery--and surrender in loaded words that are agreed upon previously?

CSO: 4604/10

NVOI DERIDES IRAN'S MOTION TO EXPEL ISRAEL FROM UN

TA172021 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 17 Oct 84

[Unattributed commentary: "The Islamic Rulers' New Ploy"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: At the 39th session of the UN General Assembly 'Ali Akbar Velayati, the Islamic regime's minister of foreign affairs, put forward a motion for the expulsion of Israel from this international organization. Following this, the regime's mass media and propaganda organizations, in accordance with the order of the Islamic regime's leaders and authorities, blew their trumpets and raised a hue and cry in the hope of portraying Iran's Islamic regime as the hero of the struggle against Zionism.

This development has caused our people and world public opinion to ask many questions which revolve primarily around two axis. Firstly, why have the Islamic rulers and their foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati--individual who for the most part learned their principles and views in the seminaries of the CIA and the British intelligence service and who used to carry out their religious rites in the night clubs of Britain and the United States, and who are among the pawns who implement the policy of international imperialism and Zionism, headed by America, in the Islamic Republic of Iran--have suddenly thought of ousting Israel from the United Nations? Are the Velayatis not aware that it is precisely the United States that supports Israel in all international organizations?

Secondly, why do Israel, Britain, Japan, the FRG and other associates and allies of U.S. imperialism extend favors and kindness to Iran's Islamic regime--a regime that depicts itself as the standard bearer of the struggle against Israel? Why is Iran's Islamic leadership calling for Israel's destruction, and is apparently trying to oust Israel from the United Nations and other international organizations, while Israel and the United States and their allies are exerting every effort to maintain and strengthen Iran's Islamic regime? Are not all the weapons, ammunition and other needs of the Islamic regime either directly provided by Israel, Britain, the FRG, Japan, and their allies, or obtained from America by Zionist brokers and middlemen and placed at the disposal of Iran's Islamic government?

By continuing the destructive U.S.-desired and U.S.-sponsored war, the Islamic rulers are preventing the unity and joint combat of progressive Arab

governments against Zionism and imperialism. They are sacrificing hundreds of thousands of our youths, teenagers and children for the interests of Israel, America, and their associates. In Pakistan they fan the flames of the Shi'ite-Sunni war. In short, everywhere and in all cases they act precisely according to the wishes of international imperialism and Zionism, led by America. Then, without the slightest shame they claim to struggle against international imperialism and Zionism, and even raise the issue of Israel's expulsion from the United Nations.

In accordance with the directive of their American masters, the Islamic rulers portray friends as enemies and vice versa. They fan the flames of hostility toward progressive anti-imperialist forces and countries, particularly toward our next door neighbor the Soviet Union, in order to deprive the homeland and the revolution of their true friends and supporters.

Yes, the mercenary Islamic rulers endeavor to depict themselves as anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist so that they can better fulfill their role in serving imperialism and Zionism. Velayati's proposal at the 39th UN General Assembly session, to expel Israel was for this purpose only. However, the Islamic government's Velayatis and their American and British masters are seriously mistaken. Just as yesterday the roaring waves of the revolution dispensed with Velayati's predecessors such as Yazdi, Bani-Sadr and Qotbzadeh, so these waves, which have never subsided--contrary to the opinion of the Islamic regime's leaders--will tomorrow also dispense with traitors to the revolution more vehemently than yesterday. They will open the way for the achievement of the revolution's targets, namely, independence, freedom, social justice, equality and fraternity of all toilers and patriots regardless of sectarian affiliations and religious beliefs.

CSO: 4640/71

COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN PAKISTAN, IRAN ELABORATED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 19 Sep 84 p 4

/Text/ Economic dispatch service--Regarding the participation of Pakistan in the 10th Tehran International Trade Fair, the Pakistan Embassy Commercial Counselor in a special interview with our correspondent answered some questions concerning the trade relations between the two countries. At the beginning of this interview our correspondent asked: "In September 1983 during the visit of Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Minister of Commerce of Pakistan, it was decided that the total value and quantity of commercial, agricultural, industrial, textile and other exchanges between the two countries will be expanded and a new shipping line be established. Please express your views as regards any progress that has been made towards these two agreements.

The Commercial Counselor of Pakistan in reply stated: "With the signing of the September 1983 agreement, both the total value and quantity of commercial exchanges between the two countries have increased considerably. While the total trade value of Pakistan's exports to Iran has increased five-fold (from 823 million rials in March 1983 to 4,542 billion rials in March 1984), Iran's exports likewise have increased nearly five times (Iran's total export value to Pakistan in 1981-82 was 22 million rials, whereas, in 1983-84 it soared to 1,038 billion rials).

Therefore, the quantity and total value of trade exchanges between the two countries have increased rapidly, and it is noted that the stagnation of trade exchanges between the two countries also has been vastly eliminated, and thus the vacuum is filled. There is no doubt that the potential for trade exchanges between the two countries is more than what has been reached so far. The government of Pakistan produces on an extensive basis raw, semifinished and finished products which are needed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

These products include rice, cereals, barley, cement, raw wool, thread, leather and leather goods, textile machinery, workshop tools and implements, knives, forks and spoons, electrical appliances, beans, vegetables, fruits, meat by-products, fertilizer, knitting materials, weaving and textile materials, handiworks, glass and china products,

surgical tools, dressing bandages, paper, stationery, engineering tools, etc. Iranian imports from Pakistan, with consideration of international standards, speed of preparation, geographic position and contiguity of the two countries are very worthwhile. Iran imports a large quantity of frozen goods from different countries. Therefore, in order to attain self-sufficiency in the matter of transportation, it was decided to establish a joint Irano-Pakistani shipping line. This shipping line will be owned jointly by Iran and Pakistan and Iran will possess 51 percent of the total share.

Preliminary procedures for the formation of the joint shipping line have almost been completed, and the final formalities will soon be realized."

Regarding the border trade exchange agreement and the approval to increase the border trade exchanges between the two countries up to 20 million rials, he said: "Both Iran and Pakistan intend to find a simpler mechanism through which we can help increase the volume of border trade exchanges. In this regard a high level four member trade delegation, directed by the Economic Counselor of Sistan va Baluchestan Province, visited Pakistan in July 1984.

Pakistan's trade authorities have asked for more information from the Iranian trade delegation as regards the afore-mentioned matter. Accordingly, they have agreed to prepare and present a list of the materials and implements which will be exported to Iran. It is hoped that with regard to the accomplished measures, the border trade exchanges between the two brotherly countries will be increased to the benefit of both sides."

12719

CSO: 4640/24

EMIGRE PAPER BLASTS KHOMEYNI'S 'BANKRUPT' CLERICAL REGIME

Paris NEHZAT in Persian 6 Sep 84 pp 1-2

/Paris NEHZAT in Persian; biweekly organ of the Iran National Resistance Movement/

/Text/ Once more Ruhollah Khomeyni, the leader and the hope of the world's oppressed made a speech to the Council of Guardians on 2 September; a translation from the Regime's radio appeared in LE MONDE of 4 September.

Khomeyni, after an introduction concerning the need for farsightedness to safeguard the "present situation" and secure the future of Islam said: "I have repeatedly stated that the clergy must guide rather than rule!"

It seems as if His Excellency the Caliph (Khomeyni) has forgotten that he made several such promises during his sojourn in Neauphly-le-Chateau, and after the formation of the provisional government of Bazargan and his short stay in Qom, his Excellency showed up in Tehran. Therefrom, with conspicuous emblazonment, he chastised the provisional government and others, and with extreme anger protected the 'clerics' by saying: "The clerics are very nice people and should be trusted with all the power." It was from that time on that the carnage, confiscation of public property, theft and robbery and plundering of the national wealth--from precious objects in government buildings and museums to ancient relics, gained momentum.

Perhaps the great protector and the ingenious leader of the poor and the world's oppressed has forgotten that the very essence of the government of the guardian-jurisprudence (Velayat-e-Faqih), namely, theocracy (of course the old-fashioned school of religion with its guarantors) would be doomed if according to his own statements they decided to effect the elimination of the clerics from the government and cancel their "license of interference" in the affairs of government. Without hesitation he would have to dump the principles of religious guardian-jurisprudence, on the rubbish heap of history.

Ruhollah Khomeyni in the speech states: "Religious dictatorship is an accusation that should not be ignored. Radios are continuously repeating these accusations, and they accuse us of arbitrary rule. The clerics should not act in such a way as to give the enemy an excuse."

This statement, while reminding us once more of the innate impudence and shamelessness of the clergy, also resembles a funny joke.

This little man, after so much carnage, transgressions and plunderings, after the opening of prisons as vast as the entire Iranian land, and after assigning and protecting such executioners as Lajvardi, Gilani and Khalkhali, now calls religious dictatorship an 'accusation' and says: "Don't act in a way that will give the enemy an excuse." Considering the fact that the legal posture and the terrorist activities of the old-fashioned clerics are clearer than the sun, there is no need in any court of law for the presentation of witnesses or any kind of testimony.

When in broad daylight the black-shirted motorcyclists--agents of the imam, attack women in the cruelest way on the streets, and under the slogan of "protection of the fortress veil" savagely beat them up, when they do not even hesitate to abuse, vilify or hit men--even old men of 70 or 80 years of age who are wearing a tie, all this is done under the same slogan of "protection of Islamic veil and decency." When no one is called to account for such inhumane actions, why should the people of Iran and the whole world look for any other witnesses!

In broad daylight on the streets of Tehran under the order of the imam the execution of "Fighters of God and religion" are carried out on the spot without lawful trials, even small children of 12 and 14 years of age are shot to death. It is baffling to see why this little shameless man talks of witnesses at all!

At a time when the Islamic "Government" assigns a few bearded clerics without turbans to ministerial posts and the president and some of his ministers don the garment of religion in the office, why does his Excellency the imam talk about 'non-interference' of the clergy in the executive affairs or why does he seek witnesses for the verification of "an arbitrary religious rule!"

LE MONDE, citing other statements made in the speech by the imam, goes on to write:

"If people start to distrust the clerics, we can conclude that clericalism is doomed to fail. When every kind of building, automobiles, and luxury objects change hands through the clergy, the outcome will be dangerous for Islam."

In other words the imam talks about theft by the clerics of the old-fashioned school and with utmost weakness and inability adds: "This problem is of great concern to me and I do not know how to solve it."

But we talk from the heart of the Iranian people and say: Mr Haj Ruhollah Khomeyni, our people have lost confidence in you and your ilk after five years now. Your clericalism, which from the very start set in motion a system of murders and terrorism in order to cover its plunderings and thieveries, was not only doomed to fail but was bankrupt to boot.

When the people of Iran and the whole world read the reports of Canard Enchaîné (a Swiss satirical magazine) they see with their own eyes how the bank accounts of the son of the eminent jurisprudent Montazeri, known as Sheykh Mohammad Ringo, and Ayatollah Beheshti are manipulated. The balance of one of these two bank accounts, which is code-named 'shahbaz,' according to reliable sources exceeds 22 million dollars. They also know that these eminent authorities who were guardians of the old religious school died in 1981. Likewise, people can figure out that by the end of the current year the balance in the secret bank accounts of the clerics in Swiss banks will have reached God knows what enormous amounts! Admission of this fact amounts to the bankruptcy of the clerical regime. One ought to tell the guardians of the old school of religion

-Iranian people have never had any trust in your clerics nor will they ever have any.

-The clerics of whom the imam is speaking, who with an insatiable appetite for worldly wealth and rank, will never be the representatives of morality, abstinence or piety. On the contrary, they always have been and will ever continue to be the greatest enemies of spirituality and clericalism.

-The people of Iran will break the dirty snouts of the imam's clerics and raze the very foundation of his religious dictatorship.

-The people of Iran, having learned their lessons after five long years of Islamic rule and having sustained heavy tolls, will never allow a government with a religious tone or color, under any conditions or circumstances rule this nation. That day is not far away!

12719

CSO: 4640/25

MINISTER DISCUSSES PLANS TO USE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN HEALTH MATTERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Sep 84 p 2

[Text] With regard to the financial and credit limitations in the current and next year, the Ministry of Health has plans under preparation to use public assistance in health matters. Dr 'Ali Reza Marandi, minister of health, in a brief conversation with KEYHAN correspondent while talking about the previously mentioned subject also discussed some future plans of this ministry.

First, regarding his trip to Turkey he stated: "By the end of the current week a four-day seminar on Islamic medicine will be held in that country. Health ministers of Islamic countries will be attending this seminar. The Iranian delegation while participating in this seminar, will most probably hold some discussions on health and remedial medicine with Turkish Health Ministry authorities and will visit some medical facilities of that country."

Regarding rumors concerning the annulment of free medical emergency services and payment for such services, he stated: "With regard to financial and credit limitations in the current and the coming year, the Health Ministry has plans under way to use public assistance in health matters. Of course so far we have not pinpointed the Tehran emergency service or any other particular ones.

But all in all we can say that payment in kind will be received for any health services rendered. It should be noted that if a problem comes up against Tehran medical emergency service or any others, it will not mean that indigent people, or those who have no access to any particular assistance will be charged for the services. As far as possible we'll try to charge only those who are quite well-off."

About the future plans of the Health Ministry he stated: "Our main objective is to secure public health. In other words, health and the teaching of health-related problems will be given priority. Of course this does not mean that remedial procedures or related problems will be neglected, rather, priority will be given to the general public's health. Through this plan the spread of disease can be prevented and thereby, a vast amount of financial and moral benefits can be gained by the country."

In this respect Dr Marandi also added: "At the present time a Consultative Procedural Council is being formed in the Ministry of Health. In the course of the next few days the members of this consultative body will be selected, and after proper debate and investigation by the Cabinet, they will begin their work. We hope with the formation of this council that the conditions for procedural planning in health matters, remedial and medical training will become clear and other related institutions can take action according to examples set forth by this council."

In conclusion, regarding the new plan for the establishment of doctors' offices, he stated: "After the physicians and the National Medical Board authorities set forth their objections to this plan, a common proces-verbal was prepared along with appropriate improvements which also had been agreed upon in a joint session of the Health Ministry and the National Medical Board. This was sent to the Council of Ministers so that in the near future proper resolutions can be reached on this plan."

12719

CSO: 4640/6

MESHKINI: CLERGY MUST SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Sep 84 p 2

[Text] Qom--Simultaneous with the arrival of the month of Moharram, the month of victory of blood over the sword, a ceremony was held in Feyzieh seminary to dispatch the seminarians and clerics of the Qom Theological Center to the farthest corners of the Islamic nation for the dissemination of the message of Ashura.

At this ceremony where a large number of seminarians, Theological Center scholars, some members of Qom's Society of Instructors as well as some political and religious personalities were present, Ayatollah Meshkini, chief of the Assembly of Experts and the Friday imam of Qom in a speech addressed to the seminarians and the clerics stated: "This propagandistic movement will be fruitful only if your motives on this journey are divine and your thoughts godly."

In the towns and villages where you start your mission, you must observe Islamic modesty and obeisance. You should not interfere in a matter which does not concern you. You have no right to interfere in the affairs of the public or private offices. Of course giving advice and making suggestions are different matters. But weakening lawful institutions and naming names of personalities and responsible authorities from the pulpit is prohibited by religion. Of course, if you have constructive criticism, you can always talk to the individuals in private and make your suggestions, but creation of discord and turmoil is against the interests of the revolution."

He also added: "You ought to give up some of the luxuries of your life and safeguard your religious and spiritual pursuits and try to observe the same old simple ways of life. During the Moharram period you have a momentous and missionary duty to perform."

The Friday imam of Qom went on to say: "You should avoid strictly subjects which will cause people to think that there is an atmosphere of division and duality.

Of course there has always been and there will always be differences of opinion and tastes, which is natural. Undoubtedly, there is in the Islamic Republic complete unity of opinion on vital issues among the high authorities of

the government and the Muslim nation as a whole. You must emphasize in your speeches that our Islamic country is a country of unity, singleness and solidarity where all the nation's organs and institutions have the necessary and complete spirit of flowing and close relations."

Ayatollah Meshkini while emphasizing the importance of the acquisition of religious knowledge to the seminarians stated: "In addition to your propagandistic mission and your attendance at the battlefronts of right against wrong, you should allocate the major part of your time and energy to the acquisition of knowledge and learning. Since at this time the future of Islam and the Revolution is dependent on this very matter, you must concentrate and apply all your efforts towards the acquisition of knowledge and scientific activities."

He furthermore added: "The seminarians should learn their lessons well in order to write well when necessary, speak laconically, and in time of action and movement, lead the way."

The Friday imam of Qom while addressing the seminarians and the clerics of the Theological Center about the same subject went on to emphasize: "The respectable seminarians who are engaged in the study of religious matters should abstain from carrying on correspondence with this and that and stop playing party politics, but rather should concentrate on their studies. Of course I am not saying that you should separate religion and studying from politics altogether, what I am saying is that the major part of your activities should be devoted to the acquisition of knowledge."

Ayatollah Meshkini regarding the unity and oneness of the Qom's Society of Instructors stated: "In the theological centers of Qom there are some respectable instructors who need to get together with others and form a larger and more unified assembly of instruction. Therefore, arrange some meetings every month and talk about the existing problems in different centers of learning and try to find expedient measures for their solution."

In conclusion, the Friday imam of Qom acknowledged the services of the clerics who, in defence of the ideals of the revolution and self-sacrifice as soldiers of the Imam-e Zaman (The Invisible Imam of the Age), have helped Islam and the Muslims. He also warned those who, because of their support for the previous regime or some other devious event, have been banished by society, and are now quietly living in Qom. These people should never think that if they sit in the center of revolt and revolution (Qom) and with the help of their pens, tongues or their thoughts move against the revolution, that the theological centers or the general public will excuse their actions and will remain silent. This is the same 'Center' which brought down the perfidious shah with all his might. If the time is ripe and the imam gives his consent, we could easily incapacitate these people and let them meet their deserved lot.

ESFAHAN SELF-SUFFICIENT IN PRODUCTION OF SEDATIVES

Rehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Sep 84 p 23

[Text] Esfahan--The Province of Esfahan has achieved self-sufficiency in sedatives, cold medication, anti-diarrheal medicines and antacids in hospital and government clinics.

In announcing this matter to IRNA, an official of the drug production unit of the regional health organization of Esfahan Province proclaimed the readiness of that unit for producing anti-allergenic syrup, vitamin C tablets, diazepam, perazine, vitamin B-6, vitamin B-1 and anti-diarrheal tablets.

He mentioned that the output of the drug production unit of the regional health organization of Esfahan, which is the first such unit outside Tehran, consists of 12 kinds of tablets and seven types of syrups. "A plan for action has been prepared," he said, "according to which forty thousand bottles of syrup will be produced daily. However, despite the purchase of the necessary equipment and raw materials, administrative problems in the year and a half since the system's equipment has been ready have meant that we are still unable to install and make use of it.

On the subject of the amount of production of his unit, the official of the drug production unit in Esfahan said: "In five months, this year, this unit has succeeded in producing 550 thousand bottles of various kinds of syrups and 12,500,000 tablets of various kinds. Compared to the same period last year this output represents an increase of 20 percent in syrup production and 50 percent in tablets."

He described the drugs produced as being comparable to generic types and complying with international standards, and he spoke of a plan for complying with international standards, and he spoke of a plan for expanding this unit: "We have in mind a piece of land with an area of five hectares for the purpose of relocating our unit and expanding it, so that in the next five years its output will reach 30 million tablets, five million bottles of syrup and one million tubes of pomade. Thus in addition to Esfahan the neighboring provinces will also be self-sufficient in drugs."

12651

CSO: 4640/409

ISLAM BEST BACKING FOR EDUCATIONAL EVOLUTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Sep 84 p 23

[Text] In a meeting with members of the Islamic Teachers' Societies of Tehran Province, Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi stressed that "if we believe that this revolution is to be a lasting one, we must take care and be sure that the Islamic societies are permanently at the side of this revolution--our hope for the future lies in this revolutionary institution."

While emphasizing the importance of the role of the Islamic societies during the meeting which took place yesterday afternoon, the prime minister also pointed out:

"The Islamic Teachers' Society is one of the most important institutions of our revolution and was formed through the efforts of the martyrs Raja'i, Bahonar and Salimi-Jahromi." Musavi added, "Today with six years gone by in the life of the Islamic Republic, we are considering a fundamental change in the system of education and training, and it is these same Islamic societies which are the basis for this idea. In the prerevolutionary period, the schools played the most important role in removing Islam from the society. Today if an effort is made to change the system of education and training, the basic burden of effort falls on the teachers, especially the members of the Islamic Teacher's Society.

"Today the teachers of our country also play a major role in guiding society on the path of revolutionary training of students. The presence of thousands of youths and adolescents on the war front against world-wide irreligion is one of the results of the efforts of the teachers."

Concerning the role of the students in the 8 September 1977 massacre, he stated: "Today we have the great strength but not enough use is made of this great force. Of course in the various ministries, such as the ministries of construction jihad and agriculture, programs are being prepared for this, but the best center for thinking about making use of the strength of 10 million students is the Islamic Teachers' Society and the Islamic Students' Society." He added, "From the very first days, the Islamic institutions have been very good in spreading the revolution into the main parts and into organizations and in opposing the paths of deviation and plots as well as

safeguarding the revolution and the Islamic Republic. Today the Islamic societies are busily engaged as the eyes and ears of the Islamic revolution in all parts of the administrative system of the country. At this juncture, societies whose members have been selected with adequate care are the best and most revolutionary kind of societies. What is needed for the strength of the Islamic societies and their success in working with officials and preventing the growth of the sprouts of **corruption** within them is for them to abstain from the stifling of thinking that comes from looking at problems relevant to only one limited area. In order to strengthen themselves, the Islamic societies must continuously seek to increase their awareness and thinking in a universal way and to keep in mind the problems of various areas simultaneously. If you really want the educational system to be changed you must above all have trust in God and be self-reliant."

12651

CSO: 4640/409

IRAN

MINISTER SAYS IRAN WILL EXPLOIT OIL FROM MAJNUN ISLANDS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 27 Sep 84 p 4

[Text] The reduction in Iran's petroleum production was in order to prevent a drop in oil prices and for the purpose of strengthening OPEC.

In the course of the war the Ministry of Petroleum has learned how to produce and export petroleum under fire. The Islamic Republic of Iran's claim that the enemy has been unable to prevent the production and export of Iranian petroleum is logical in terms of the war.

At no time in the course of the war has a ship called at Khark Island to load petroleum and returned empty.

Yesterday afternoon Minister of Petroleum Mohammad Gharazi held a press conference for domestic and foreign correspondents. He discussed the activities of the Ministry of Petroleum in the course of the war, the status of Iran's petroleum exports, petroleum sales, Iran's position in the coming OPEC meeting, and the exploitation of the oil fields at Majnun Islands. He began by discussing the aim of Iraq's military objective in attacking Iran. He said: The aim of Iraq's attack on Iran, especially with regard to petroleum resources, was to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran by stopping the production and refinement of oil. Even though this regime attacked the northern parts of Iran at first, it intended all along to concentrate most of its forces in the south of our country. He added: The instructions that were given to Iraq mainly concerned taking over the petroleum resources, disabling petroleum installations and factories, and preventing the export of oil. The Abadan refinery in the south of Iran carried 60 percent of Iran's petroleum refining capability. It is natural that in a swift and short war, if a country's energy supplies drop by 40 percent, and 60 percent of its refining capabilities are also eliminated, this economic and war machinery will also disappear. Iraq's reason for attacking the south of Iran was not merely to stop Iran's oil production, but also to prevent refinery operations.

With regard to the status of petroleum exports from Khark Island, Gharazi noted that the war-mongering Iraqi regime has so far lost 41 warplanes over Khark Island and Bushehr. He stressed: In four years of war, despite much military pressure, no contract with a customer has been broken, and neither

has a ship ever called at Khark Island to load and returned empty. At the same time, although our stores of petroleum on Khark Island have caught fire at times as a result of attacks by the Ba'thist Regime of Iraq, at those same times the loading and exporting of oil continued.

He announced: One thing the Ministry of Petroleum has learned in this war is how to produce and export petroleum under fire.

The Minister of Petroleum also said: It may be incomprehensible to the technocrats of the world that a country could produce oil while an extensive war is being imposed upon it, but no one in the world who is familiar with the war in Iran doubts that Iran produces and exports petroleum under enemy fire.

Petroleum Extraction from the Kheybar Region

According to Gharazi, in the course of the war the Ministry of Petroleum of the Islamic Republic of Iran has put production, export, drilling, transport, and all other activities related to petroleum in good order, while giving up 200 martyrs. He added: With enemy bullets flying over our heads, we capped two burning wells that were pouring oil into the Persian Gulf, restored the Abadan refinery, and salvaged a great many of its implements under fire. Continuing the conference, the Minister of Petroleum said: With respect to the question of how we learned to produce oil in wartime, we are announcing today that we plan to produce oil from the great military area and oil field at Kheybar. He added: We have obtained the necessary equipment to drain the waters of Khor al-Hovizeh; with God's help, when we drain these waters, God willing, we will be able to begin producing oil from the Majnun Islands.

He announced: The Ministry of Petroleum's drilling in the course of the war has tripled, and refining has increased by 50 percent, and the continuation of the war will bring our country to a speedy victory.

The Minister of Petroleum was asked whether Iraqi aggression was what had caused Iran to reduce oil production by 50 percent or not. He answered: Iran has never made decisions on its level of oil production because of pressure. The reduction of Iran's petroleum production was solely the result of market pressure, in order to prevent a drop in the price of oil and to protect and strengthen OPEC. Military concerns had absolutely no effect on this.

He was asked what percentage of Iranian petroleum is sold on the barter system. He answered: The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that countries that sell merchandise to us ought to buy petroleum from us; they must not expect Iran to sell its petroleum to one country and use that currency to buy merchandise from another country. In other words, we continue our relationships with regard to oil sales in terms of mutual exchanges with various countries.

He added: We can only have economic relations with countries on the basis of mutual exchanges. For example, if a company refuses to buy Iran's oil, it is natural that there will be an economic response to that company in Iran. He

stressed: Iran never sells its oil at a price below the official OPEC price, but for some Third World countries concessions other than in the price of oil have been made.

Saddam Cannot Hit Khark

A foreign correspondent asked him what Iran would do if Saddam were to strike at Khark Island. He said: If Saddam were capable of striking Khark Island he would have done it by now; we were unconcerned about Saddam's invasion four years ago, and we are also unconcerned about this.

He noted: The presence of Western and American warships near the Strait of Hormoz shows that the West has despaired of equipping Iraq to attack the Islamic Republic of Iran.

With regard to the question of how Iran would obtain the currency it needs if the Strait of Hormoz were closed, Engineer Gharazi said: The Iranian revolution was not based on the production of oil, and neither is its continuation. If we decide to close the Strait of Hormoz, we know how to export petroleum and obtain currency.

Concerning Iran's relationship with Mexico, the Minister of Petroleum said: Mutual industrial cooperation exists between Iran and Mexico, and prior to every OPEC meeting detailed arrangements are made with our Mexican friends on petroleum affairs.

He was asked whether the Iran-Japan petrochemical project would be stopped. Noting that so far not a single tanker has been sunk in the Persian Gulf, he said: Work never stops in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In conclusion, he discussed the possibility of a special OPEC meeting. He said: If a special OPEC meeting should be held, Iran will be opposed to any change in previous decisions and will insist that market conditions be returned to those of former days.

9310

CSO: 4640/46

ACTIVITIES OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION ELABORATED

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 26 Sep 84 p 11

[Text] JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI News Desk--The acting director of the Defense Industries Organization held a press conference on the fourth day of War Week. He answered questions from correspondents concerning various innovations and growth in military weaponry since the triumph of the Islamic revolution. Our correspondent reports that he began by giving a brief history of the Defense Industries Organization. He said: The Defense Industries Organization was formed close to 50 years ago; its first factory was the Bornu War Implements Factory, which was purchased from Germany.

In the year 1307 [21 March 1928 - 20 March 1929] the Parchin Chemical Factory was built for the preparation of raw materials for ammunition and gunpowder. In 1314 [21 March 1935 - 20 March 1936] the Ghaniabad Foundry was established, which went into operation in 1320 [21 March 1941 - 20 March 1942]

Ammunition factories for the production of ammunition were established 40 years ago; in the year 1343 [21 March 1964 - 20 March 1965] all of these industries were combined into a single unit called Defense Industries.

In accordance with Article One of a law enacted by the Majlis and the Council of Ministers in 1360 [21 March 1981 - 20 March 1982], a single organization called the Defense Industries Organization was established to handle production activities and services for the armed forces. Concerning the various industrial sectors of this organization, he said: In accordance with the aforementioned law, the Defense Industries Organization consists of seven industrial groups, including weapons industries, mechanical industries, electronic communications industries, aircraft industries, research and development for defense industries, rocket industries, and naval industries.

He added: The organization's objective is to procure the weaponry needs of the armed forces, including everything from equipment to ammunition. Currently, of course, it is repairing helicopter gunships and squadrons of aircraft, but, God willing, in the near future it will take on the job of constructing helicopters, aircraft, naval vessels, and military vehicles for the ground, air, and naval forces.

Continuing his remarks, the Acting Director of the Defense Industries Organization added: In the research and development group of the Defense Industries Organization, our researches are busy producing new weapons and inventions, a number of which have reached the production line and are even now in use at the fronts. God willing, more of these weapons which are completed and constructed by Iranian thinkers and inventors will soon reach the production line.

The research and development group of the Defense Industries Organization has signed numerous contracts with the universities and research centers within the country in order to make better use of fruitful Iranian talents and manpower and establish an ample base from which to conduct research.

The Acting Director of the Defense Industries Organization added: Under the economic embargo, the procurement of ammunition, war implements and equipment needed by combat forces was very difficult and at times impossible. However, the good tidings must be given to the dear nation of Iran that through the grace of God and the special concern of His Holiness the Imam of the Age, may God hasten his joyful advent, in the four years of the imposed war, the Defense Industries Organization has procured a significant amount of the needs of the God-seeking combatants at the fronts of the war of the Truth against the Vain, and won the praise of the superpowers.

He said: The value of goods produced this year compared to the first six months of last year [21 March - 22 Sep 1983] has increased by about 20 billion rials.

He then added: Up to around one million rounds of various kinds of ammunition have been made in our munitions industries.

He then compared this organization's current production with production during the era of the idolaters. He said: Compared to the era of the idolaters, some products have increased ten fold, and this is the greater percentage of these products; in general there is no comparison with the era of the idolaters. He continued: A 155 millimeter shell, which formerly exploded into 70 to 80 fragments at most, with metallurgic and engineering improvements that have been made now produces 1,000 fragments, which represents a ten-fold increase in the quality of production rounds. With regard to helicopter gunships and aircraft squadrons, he said: Under the regime of the idolaters, only American specialists were authorized to work in this area, but after the revolution, committed and specialist Iranian forces succeeded in repairing helicopter gunships and warplanes and turning them over to the air force more than during the era of the Americanized traitors, and in such a way that the flight capability of our flying forces increased 100 percent in the last six months alone. It must be noted that under the regime of the idolaters 1,450 American experts and technicians were working in the Iranian helicopter support services alone. Under the economic embargo, which was directly influenced by criminal America and which brought pressure on the aircraft industries and on the defense industries more than anywhere else, through the

grace of God and the efforts of laborers, officers, and engineers working in the aircraft industries, many parts for helicopters, F-4 and F-5 fighters, and even the F-14, which only Iran and America have, have been made.

With regard to industries that were not completed during the time of the idolaters, he said: A large number of industries which were abandoned in a state of half-completion by foreign contractors have been completed and put into operation by Iranian specialists, and other half-completed projects are in the process of being completed. A correspondent asked: What plans are you carrying out to procure ammunition for the fronts? He answered: As you know, the Defense Industries Organization makes a significant quantity of the things needed at the front, and, God willing, with the plans that are being carried out and with the help and assistance of the hard-working government we will be 100 percent self-sufficient and without need of foreign countries in the area of munitions. It is even planned that we will be able to export some military and production items.

A correspondent asked: How many kinds of military goods are made in the country? He answered: The number of items that we can presently produce is approximately all the munitions whose weapons exist in Iran, more than tens of items; with regard to the production of light ammunition, which was imported prior to the revolution, we are now totally self-sufficient and have absolutely no need of foreign sources. With regard to heavy ammunition, with the plans now being made, God willing, we will soon be self-sufficient.

Our correspondent asked: What steps have been taken toward the manufacture of heavy war equipment? He said: No steps were taken under the regime of the idolaters towards the manufacture of heavy war equipment, while this was considered one of the basic needs of our armed forces. We therefore undertook a series of studies in this area with top-priority projects.

A correspondent asked: Is it likely we will be able to quickly convert the factories under the mantle of the Ministry of Defense for use in the production system, according to need? With regard to this he added: With the changes that will be made in these factories by specialist Iranian minds, we will be able to change the type of goods produced. For example, in peacetime we will be able to make a large number of non-military items.

According to this report, at the conclusion of the press conference the Acting Director of the Defense Industries Organization stressed: We call upon those knowledgeable in these matters to collaborate with us in order to provide the necessary cooperation with our industrial research group. It is necessary to mention that we are cooperating closely with the self-sufficiency crusade in the universities.

RADIO IRAN REPORTS ON ANTI-REGIME PAMPHLETS

GF151629 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 15 Oct 84

[Text] Nationalist elements report that the circulation of nightletters and unsigned political pamphlets have put the Islamic regime's authorities in a quandary. Due to their profusion, the regime cannot control them, especially because most of the officials of Iran's postal department are not prepared to cooperate with the Islamic regime in this matter.

A postal source says that the number of unsigned letters and the number of pamphlets and nightletters is so great that the people have become quite used to reading and receiving them. In answer to a question about the contents of these political circulars, he says, whatever takes place in the country and whatever treachery is committed by the Islamic Republic authorities, messages and important reports received by these (?arcane) strugglers are soon circulated among others by using these couriers.

Nationalist elements report that Mahmud Safari, the Islamic Majlis deputy, recently said in an open session of the Majlis that drastic punishment must be meted out to those who circulated such pamphlets and nightletters. Safari said that such pamphlets and unsigned nightletters would serve to make the people deviate from the course of unity.

CSO: 4640/70

TUDEH PARTY CC GREETINGS TO SED ON ANNIVERSARY

AU151029 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 10 Oct 84 p 7

[Text] SED Central Committee:

Dear comrades, on the 35th anniversary of the GDR, the first worker-peasant state on German soil, we want to most cordially congratulate you on behalf of the members of our party and all working people of Iran.

The foundation of the GDR was a truly historic event of international significance; it was an enormous step towards bringing about stable peaceful relationships in Europe and throughout the world.

The 35-year history of the GDR is marked by a continuing and untiring struggle for peace, disarmament, detente, peaceful coexistence, and for the optimum satisfaction of the material and intellectual demands of the working people of the GDR. Under the leadership of the SED, the Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the workers class, and as a firm element of the community of socialist states with the Soviet Union at the head, the GDR working people have built on the ruins of a murderous fascist war a flourishing socialist country with a dynamic economy, which is free of exploitation and crises, a country that is highly praised and respected throughout the world.

Dear comrades, allow us to take the 35th anniversary as an opportunity to wish you and your country further great successes. We are deeply convinced that the efforts of the GDR for strengthening peace and eliminating the dangers of a thermonuclear inferno are an extremely noble undertaking that are in the interest of all peace-loving and progressive people of the world.

With socialist greetings

Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran

CSO: 4620/5

U.S. TO TRY SWISS NATIONAL FOR ATTEMPTED SALE TO IRAN

LD132255 Tehran IRNA in English 1850 GMT 13 Oct 84

[Text] Tehran, Oct 13, IRNA--The United States' hostile policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran has been unchanged since the victory of the Islamic revolution in early 1979 and the latest news in this connection is not surprising.

A Swiss national has been reportedly freed on bail by a U.S. court to later face charges of attempting to sell 400,000 pairs of chemical protective clothing to Iran. Regardless of the point that such a deal was to take place or not, the mere fact that an individual will go on trial in an American court for such a "violation" shows the U.S. stance on chemical warfare in the Iraqi war against Iran.

When the Iraqi regime in a blatant violation of all international and humanitarian laws, deployed chemical weapons on a wide-scale against Iranian combatants in late February and March, the U.S. administration was the first to apparently condemn Iraq, and the U.N. followed suit. However, documents published later revealed that the hurried reaction to the Iraqi chemical warfare was really a ploy by the U.S. Government to divert world public opinion and cover-up its supply of lethal chemicals to Baghdad, which were then used against Iran.

The case of an individual being charged with attempting chemical protective suits to Iran is another show of U.S. solidarity with Iraq. [sentence as received] Although responsible officials here, contacted by IRNA had no knowledge of such an attempt, nevertheless, the prosecutor's charges are very revealing. The fact that someone would face trial on such a charge clearly implies that the U.S. would do everything it can to weaken the defence of Iran's Muslim forces.

It is no secret that there would be no problem to purchase chemical protective suits from the international arms market. On the other hand, the Islamic forces of Iran have demonstrated their ability to fight the aggressor Iraqi regime and Iran's defence against Iraq's chemical weapons was demonstrated in the Khaybar offensive in late February which led to the capture of the oil-rich Iraqi Majnun Islands.

The Islamic Republic rightly believes that the Iraqis will probably use chemical weapons against Iran in the future, since they, unlike Iran, have not given a positive response to the call by the U.N. secretary general for a halt in their use. Iran's determination to prosecute the defence of its homeland will continue, despite the complicity of its enemies to weaken this divine resolve.

CSO: 4600/36

MINISTER SAYS ELECTION COMMITTEE TO TOUR COUNTRY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Oct 84 p 3

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 4: Federal Interior Minister, Mahmud A. Haroon, who is also the Chairman of the Cabinet's Committee to Co-ordinate the election programme, has said that the Committee will visit various parts of the country after Muharram and will meet the political leaders of the country.

In an interview published in a local daily, the Minister, however, stated that no politician will be invited by his Committee for negotiations in Islamabad. Talks on matters relating to the holding of elections in the country could be discussed with the politicians during the Committee's visit to different parts of the country. The politicians could submit their proposals and suggestions in writing also, he added.

The Minister categorically denied that the Government intended to bring persons of its own choice in the assemblies by disqualifying certain candidates.

He said that some changes would be introduced in the elections rules and regulations and the Election Commission was busy finalising these changes, he said, will be announced well in advance and will be applicable all the candidates without any discrimination.

He further said that it was not yet decided whether the elections would be held on party basis or non-party basis.

When asked what would be the official reaction if MRD decided to boycott the election, the Minister

said that it would not be a matter of concern. There are some groups in MRD who wanted to participate in the elections, he added.

Asked whether the persons who were declared disqualified for the elections in 1979 could take part in the forthcoming elections, the Minister said that they were disqualified for five years and some of them have completed this period. However, some changes in the election rules are needed to allow them to take part in the elections, he said.

Asked whether Miss Benazir Bhutto and the leadership of her party would be allowed to participate in the elections, the Minister said that it depended on election rules.

He further expressed the view that even if the elections were held on non-party basis, they will be political.

Replying to a question he said that the ban on political activities would be removed about 45 days before the elections. But the Government would never allow any kind of disturbances. He further said that the right of appeal will be given to the persons disqualified for elections.

He said that his Committee would meet soon and will remain functioning till the holding of elections.

Replying to a question he said that he would not take part in the elections. - PPI

TRADE RELATIONS WITH CHINA DISCUSSED

GF121304 Karachi DAWN in English 9 Oct 84 Economic and Business Review Supplement p 1

[Text] Karachi, Oct 8--Mr Ji Ge, Chinese commercial Counsellor, called on newly elected president of Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, Mr Tariq Sayeed, and held fruitful discussions on matters of mutual interest.

Mr Muhammed Hussain Kapadia, senior vice president of the chamber, Mr Aftab Khalili, vice president and Mr Mohammad Ilias Wadhawan, member of managing committee, were also present on the occasion.

The Chinese commercial counsellor, while expressing satisfaction on the existing pace of trade, expressed the hope that the coming years would witness still expanding volume of trade between the two countries.

Mr Ji Ge stressed that in the context of new emerging economic pattern of China, there would be larger opportunities for promotion of two-way trade as well as setting up of joint-ventures. He said that the possibilities of joint-ventures in chemicals, medicines, tyres and tubes and plants and machinery etc. could be explored in a big way.

The commercial counsellor outlined the salient features of the new economic strategy of China which was characterised by flexible approaches, de-centralisation and emphasis on collaboration with foreign investors.

He agreed with the idea of exchanging more trade delegations between the two friendly countries for greater understanding of exchangeable goods.

The chamber president, Mr Tariq Sayeed, while appreciating the notable and many-sided role that China has played in promoting the socio-economic resources of the country, stressed the need for making renewed efforts to further augment the economic and commercial relations between the two friendly countries.

He said that Chinese goods enjoy marketability and creditability in Pakistan and as such, no void be created due to the non-availability of these goods in the market.

The chamber chief said that the frequent exchange of trade delegations between the two countries and the mutual exchange of views would indeed go a long way in accomplishing the desired objective.

He said there should be greater contacts and cooperation between the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Karachi, in Pakistan and its counterparts in China.

The chamber chief indicated the possibility of sponsoring chamber's delegation to visit China. He said that the chamber would also examine the possibility of holding a single-country exhibition in China.

Mr Tariq Sayeed stated that the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan would be requested to deliver a talk on Pak-China economic relations.

CSO: 4600/35

SECTARIAN CLASHES DEPLORED

GF131734 Lahore NAWA-E WAQT in Urdu 8 Oct 84 p 3

[Editorial: "O Followers of 'Ali and Abubakr, Take Heed"]

[Text] The whole nation should ponder over the clashes and trouble that erupted on Ashura which created a very unfortunate situation and caused loss of life and property at a time when the country is confronted with external dangers and when internal national unity is extremely essential. In such circumstances how did certain elements manage to create discord in their obsession with bigotry and prejudice or for their own ulterior motives? The governor of Sind has ordered a high-level probe into the incident, its causes, and the identities of those who were instrumental in bringing things to such a head that clashes took place.

The fact that such an incident took place is in itself regrettable and the nation in general and the religious scholars in particular should ponder over how to avert such internecine clashes in future. God forbid, if such a flame is fanned and the Pakistani Muslims become so overcome with prejudice and emotions that they fight among each other, then it will be very easy for Pakistan's external enemies to harm not only its freedom and independence but also its Islamic character. This is not the time to accentuate sectarian differences. The need of the hour is to muster all resources to create national feelings of tolerance above all petty bickering for the sake of fostering inter-Muslim unity. The Karachi authorities should also consider carefully what basic loopholes exist in their arrangements and procedures that allow this sort of trouble and loss to have become an annual feature.

CSO: 4656/12

WALI KHAN SAID TO BE ONLY NDP CHOICE FOR PRESIDENCY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Oct 84 pp 1, 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Oct. 4: Former leader of the opposition in the National Assembly Abdul Wali Khan seems to be the only choice for the Presidentship of the defunct National Democratic Party, the Central Council of which is due to meet in Peshawar within about a month for the purpose.

Currently, the Khan is holding no office in the Party while the sitting President, Sardar Sher Baz Mazari, as well as the Vice President Begum Nasim Wali Khan, have completed two terms and under the Party constitution no central office-bearer can seek re-election beyond that period. Another important office-holder at the central level is the Secretary General, Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, who has completed only one term but he would be the last person to aspire for the office of President if Wali Khan is a candidate. The matter has been under discussion for quite some time now and the consensus in the party is that it is only Wali Khan who can lead, particularly in the critical political situation obtaining in the country. Although Wali is

reportedly resisting the proposal the Party believes that it would be difficult for him to say no to the decision of the Central Council. The Council comprises 320 members - 80 from each of the four provinces.

At the provincial level, the elections are due to be held in the third week of this month and those tipped for the Presidentship include the sitting chief, Abdul Khaliq Khan, Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour and Mohammad Afzal Khan. While Abdul Khaliq Khan is said to have expressed the desire that he should not be considered, Mohammad Afzal Khan too has indicated his inability but on different grounds. Being the convener of the election committee of the Party he does not deem it proper to be considered for the job although there is no such bar on him. As such only Ghulam Ahmad Bilour is left in the field but the Party in all probability would like to retain him as the central Secretary General and hence the final choice is likely to be Abdul Khaliq Khan.

STEEL MILL HAS 737 SOVIET EXPERTS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] Islamabad, Oct 4--There are a total number of 737 Soviet experts and 36 interpreters working at the Pakistan Steel Mill, retired Brigadier Reza, Resident Director, PSM, disclosed during a lecture in the Pakistan Manpower Institute here.

Explaining the training programme of PSM employees, he said that during the last year, only two Pakistanis were sent to the USSR while 57 were sent to other countries, including Turkey and Egypt who have the same type of Soviet-built steel mills in operation. He denied that all the components for the steel-making project have been purchased from the USSR and said that companies from Japan, France, West Germany, U.K. and the USA have provided different machineries for the project.

He said the PSM has one of the biggest metallurgical laboratories spread over 115,000 square metres with facilities to train 12,000 artisans per annum. There is also a well-equipped language laboratory with facilities to teach English, Arabic and Russian.

He said ores and other raw material are purchased from Australia, Brazil, USA, Liberia and India. Coal and other ores in Pakistan are not of sufficiently high standard.

Brigadier (Retd) Reza said PSM will help in launching at least twenty different kinds of industries, including automobile and defence industries.

He said that PSM has provided jobs to almost 20,000 workers under the highly skilled managerial staff trained to serve in extreme conditions of stress. He said that though the element of psychological disturbance is there for those who work in the blast furnace, heating mill and other such departments, yet the most qualified panel of psychiatrists have so far prevented any fatal incident.

The PSM has been completed with a total cost of Rs 25,000 million in ten years.

CSO: 4600/32

QUEST FOR ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY TERMED 'ELUSIVE'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Oct 84 p 4

[Text]

Lofty ideals devoid of conviction are prone to turn into platitudes. Not only do they lose their pristine appeal to the populace, but even their authenticity becomes suspect. Needless to say, each cause calls for a precise definition; its meaning, targets and direction have to be concretised in order to make it operative. But in case a cause is owned by forces with divergent perceptions and conflicting interests, the inherent ambiguity may often lead to its misinterpretation and misuse for ulterior motives. A somewhat similar tragedy seems to have befallen the cherished goal of Islamic solidarity.

What is the meaning of Islamic

solidarity? Does it mean preserving the status quo and promoting the imperialist interests, or does it entail a unified struggle against the forces which seek to subjugate and exploit the Muslim masses? Who are the enemies of the Muslim world and who are its friends? Notwithstanding the sanctity or the popular appeal of the ideal of solidifying the Muslims, its concept had such varied connotations in the past that there seems no consensus even on its immediate objectives.

ON LOOKOUT

At one time the Western powers, in order to safeguard their imperialist domination of the Muslim countries, conceived it as a bulwark against the "onslaught of Communism." Though the backlash of the Iranian Revolution has made them apprehensive of playing the Islamic card, their inherent inability to offer democracy and rule of law as an alternative to totalitarianism, impels them to sponsor moves for Islamic unity that would further their own interests. Their hearts bleed when the Soviet troops occupy Afghanistan, and they want the entire Islamic world to unite and resist the Russian aggression. They even recall the days when the Russians had annexed the Muslim states of Central Asia and remind the Muslims of their obligation to liberate their brethren from Soviet bondage. But when it comes to the Palestinians, they would like them to be wiped out so that the legitimacy of the Zionist entity is firmly established. Their prescription for the Lebanese crisis is to ensure a perpetual hegemony of the Phalangist-Zionist alliance.

The Muslim countries being a part of the Third World are faced with almost identical problems. Their primary objective ought to be to liberate themselves from the shackles of the colonial past and assert their national sovereignty. Secondly, a movement against auto-

cratic political regimes and unjust social systems is warranted so that the ruling elites do not barter away the national interests for preserving their privileged positions. So long as the Muslim world does not rid itself free of imperialist dominance and of regimes willing to serve as their surrogates, efforts to unite the Islamic world are liable to be exploited for purposes incompatible with the spirit of the ideal.

The goal of Islamic solidarity has remained elusive not only because the Muslim world is disunited but also because there is a divergence of perceptions. Lack of unanimity on its objectives and direction makes the cleavage irreparable. If Egypt can get away with the recognition of Israel, and its betrayal is not only condoned but also legitimised by its re-admission to the OIC, it can only damage and weaken the efforts to promote the cause of Islamic unity on an international level. Jordan's capitulation to the U.S. strategy has paved the way for other weaklings to cast off their pretence of offering resistance to Zionist expansionism. Thus, the one issue which had the potential of becoming the basis of Muslim unity and the immediate target of endeavour has been abandoned by a section of the Muslim world.

As long as Iran, Syria, Libya and Algeria maintain their present stance, the U.S. designs to bulldoze resistance to the Zionist entity may still have to counter viable opposition despite the apparent taming of the PLO. Thus the Muslim world is likely to be split up into two distinct camps, striving for different objectives and moving in opposite directions. Though, in the ultimate analysis, the opportunism and shortsightedness of the capitulationist line will

be exposed and the masses are likely to reject it, in the immediate future the pronounced disunity and disarray in the ranks of the Muslims will be a great setback. In the wake of popular unrest, the status-quo-oriented regimes may seek direct U.S. involvement and the Gulf region may be turned into a battlefield. In such an eventuality the line of demarcation would be clearly drawn and the acid test of one's credentials would be on whose side one is.

KNOWING FRIENDS

In order to transform the ideal of Islamic solidarity into reality, the friends and enemies of the Islamic world need to be clearly identified. We have also to take into account the enemies from within who will subvert the cause by paying lip service to it and damage its credibility by refusing to act when the situation demands. It is a pity that many a times Muslim nations were deserted by their own brothers in Islam who turned their backs on them in moments of crisis.

Problems crucial to the existence of Muslim nations were not even recognised and taking principled positions was avoided on one pretext or the other. Many causes which ought to have received unqualified support of the entire Muslim world were sacrificed at the altar of expediency. The dichotomy in the professed and the actual behaviour of many Muslim countries and their low credibility as trustworthy friends has made the quest for Islamic solidarity even more elusive. Thus a modest beginning in the direction of well defined goals will certainly be more fruitful than raising hollow slogans and making pompous claims.

BRIEFS

NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION--Twenty-five million cubic feet (M.C.F.) of natural gas will be produced daily from the first well of Nandpur gasfield. Drilling of the second well will be completed within 45 days. Survey to find the natural gas and oil is being conducted within the area of 2,500 square kilometres. This was disclosed by Dr Asad Mohammad Khan, federal minister of state for petroleum and natural resources, while inaugurating the drilling of second well at Nandpur, 42 miles from Multan. He said the first well produced 25 million cubic feet of gas per day, out of which ten million cubic feet of gas has been considered fit for the use of industrial units and domestic use, whereas the rest of 15 million cubic feet per day is nitrogen gas. He disclosed that the government of Pakistan was spending Rs 20,000 million on the import of oil whereas our country is producing oil worth Rs 30,000 million. Earlier, Mr Ziauddin Malik, chairman, Oil and Gas Development Corporation, told the federal state minister that the corporation was drilling the wells more than 2,000 metres deep. He said the corporation's engineers have completed the drilling of the well in advance of the scheduled time and made a record drilling. Work was started by Soviet experts who went back in 1970. [Excerpts] [Karachi DAWN in English 10 Oct 84 p 1 GF]

ASGHAR KHAN BARRED FROM SIND--A leading Pakistan opposition leader, Mr Asghar Khan, said in Islamabad today that he has been asked not to tour the Sind Province. According to REUTER the order will be effective for 30 days from today. [Excerpt] [Delhi Domestic Service in English 1530 GMT 13 Oct 84]

ACTION AGAINST TEACHER CRITICIZED--Islamabad, Oct 4--Mr Omar Asghar Khan, who was dismissed from the Punjab University under MLR 51 last November, has deplored the show cause notice served on Professor Zafar Arif, President, Karachi University Academic Staff Association. He told 'The Muslim' that the notice served under MLR 51 on Prof Zafar Arif points towards the manner in which the autonomy and sanctity of institutions of higher education is being violated by the arbitrary application of various martial law orders. Mr Omar Asghar Khan, who is also a member of the working committee of the Lahore Education Society, further stated that Dr Arif is being victimised at the behest and instigation of elements who are intolerant towards teachers holding independent and enlightened points of view. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Oct 84 p 3]

NEPALI SCHOLAR SPEAKS ON AFGHANISTAN--President of the Nepal Council of World Affairs Dr Mohan Prasad Lohani has said that the majority of the South Asian countries share identical views on the Afghanistan problem and understand that a political solution to it will be possible only when foreign forces are withdrawn from there. He was giving a lecture on South Asia and super-powers in the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad yesterday. He said the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has caused great concern among the region's countries and has created a security problem for other countries in the region. Earlier, Dr Lohani met with the foreign secretary, Niaz A. Naik, and exchanged views with him on matters of mutual interest. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 12 Oct 84]

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